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INTRODUCTION

The word "community" has many definitions, applications, and

values associated with it.' It is a concept as well as an ideal. The goal
of the deinstitutionalization movement, which began in the 1960s and
which continues today, was to return people with mental disabilities
to the community.2 For at least three decades, our explicit national

1. See, e.g., Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment and the Loss of
Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685,715 (1992) (arguing that Declaration of Independence and Bill
of Rights are based on individual rights, not values of community, and that judicial doctrines
imply that "community as a value is ...subversive of" individualism); Stephen A. Gardbaum,
Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 686 n.4 (1992) (noting that most
discussion in legal literature focuses on values of "community" rather than "reflecting upon the
phenomenon" of community); Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for
National Identity, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1504, 1504 (1986) (arguing that community exists when and
where individuals act against their own interests for common good). At least one commentator
has observed:
To ask whether a society is a community is not simply to ask whether a large number
of its members happen to have among their various desires the desire to associate with
others or to promote communitarian aims-although this may be one feature of a
community-but whether the society itself is a society of a certain kind, ordered in a
certain way, such that community describes its basic structure and not merely the
dispositions of persons within the structure. For a society to be a community in this
strong sense, community must be constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the
participants and embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply an attribute
of certain of the participants' plans of life.
MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LJBERALISM AND THE LiMrrs OFJUSTICE 173 (1982).
2. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelters and Congregate Housing.
DeinstitutionalizationPolicies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 416
(1986) (explaining that goal of deinstitutionaization is "to shift the focus of treatment" to
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policy has been to provide care and treatment in the community for
people with mental disabilities.- President Kennedy declared in 1963
that "[w] e must act... to retain in and return to the community the
mentally ill and mentally retarded [in order] to restore and revitalize
their lives."4
Much has been written about deinstitutionalization, from the
meaning of the term5 to judgments about its success or failure.'
These issues will not be revisited here. Rather, the purpose of this
Article is to explore whether people with mental disabilities have
achieved true integration into our residential communities. Fifteen
years after President Kennedy's declaration, the President's Commission on Mental Health reported that "ghettos" of the mentally
disabled "destroy the residential character of the affected neighborhoods and subvert the right of handicapped persons to live in normal
residential surroundings."7 Today, thirty years after the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 discrimination against people with
mental disabilities continues.
This Article explores our nation's tradition of housing discrimination against people with mental disabilities and the strategies used to
overcome such discrimination. Part I briefly reviews the history of
access to housing by people with mental disabilities. Part II discusses
the legislative antecedents to the Fair Housing Amendments Act of

"home environs").
3. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text (discussing national policy of
deinstitutionalization).
4. Special Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, PUB. PAPERS 137
(Feb. 5, 1963).
5. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalhation,Homelessness, and
LiberatarianTheory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 378 (1982) (defining deinstitutionalization as "movement
of patients from state psychiatric hospitals to alternative community facilities"); see also Mary L.
Durham, The Impact ofDeinstitutionalizationon the Current Treatment of the Mentally 14, 12 INT'LJ.L.
& Psvc iiATRY 117, 119 (1989) (stating that goal of deinstitutionalization is "to reduce the
inpatient population of public mental hospitals, reserving hospitalization as an option for the
most severely impaired patients who were mentally ill and dangerous"),
6. See, e.g., ANN B. JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINsTrtunONAuZATION 118-20 (1990) (stating that deinstitutionalization did not actually work as planned);
Durham, supranote 5, at 122 ("Deinstitutionalization has now been labeled as a failure by many
families, clinicians, researchers, and policymakers.") (citations omitted); Michael L. Perlin,
Competency, Deinstitutionalzation,and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,28 Hous. L.REv. 63,
81 (1991) ("Deinstitutionalization is society's 'whipping boy.' Heuristically, we perceive it as
a massive social failure . .. .") (footnote omitted); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 375
("Deinstitutionalization, once hailed as an ideal social reform, is now decried as a near
disaster."). But see Perlin, supra, at 89 ("[T]here coexists an ample, largely uncontradicted but
regularly ignored body of evidence that indicates that a well-conceived deinstitutionalization
program... has a positive and significant effect....").
7. 4 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH 1390 (1978).
8. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 and 42 U.S.C.).
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1988 (FHAA), 9 including Executive Order 11,063,1" the Fair Housing Act of 1968,"' the Civil Rights Act of 1866,12 and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1974.1' Part III discusses the FHAA, which
represents the boldest action by the Federal Government to prohibit
discrimination against people with disabilities. The FHAA marks the
first federal initiative to explicitly prohibit discrimination, in private
as well as public housing, against people with disabilities, including
people labeled mentally ill or people with developmental disabilities.
Part III compares the FHAA with section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, which also prohibits discrimination in housing, but only by
programs receiving federal financial assistance.
Part III also reviews specific provisions of the FHAA, including its
prohibition against the use of zoning laws and restrictive covenants to
exclude people with mental disabilities from residential communities.
In addition to reviewing state laws enacted to preempt local
exclusionary zoning ordinances, this Part analyzes selected court
challenges to local zoning decisions as well as recent cases brought by
the United States Department ofJustice and private groups to enforce
provisions of the FHAA. The Article concludes with a discussion of
the need to amend state fair housing laws to conform to the federal
FHAA and proposes strategies to further promote the integration of
people with mental disabilities and to assist them in securing homes
of their own.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOUSING FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES

A person's quality of life depends largely on where he or she lives.
Where a person works often depends on the location of his or her
home. The school a child attends and the quality of education
received are often determined by a child's home address. The
neighborhood in which a child grows up can influence the values and
behavior of the individual throughout his or her life.
For people with mental illness, mental retardation, or developmental disabilities, the choice of housing has been severely limited, often
regardless of the individual's financial resources. In many states,
9. Pub. L No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2342 (1988)).
10. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963), repinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (1988).
11. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
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people with mental disabilities have been, and continue to be,
restricted to the least attractive parts of a community-to neighborhoods where housing is relatively inexpensive and often unsafe. 4
People with mental disabilities have a history of inadequate
housing. Until the middle part of this century, they were often locked
away in large facilities in remote areas.' 5 Since the 1960s, this nation
has increasingly accepted the notion that training, treatment, and
habilitation of people with mental disabilities is generally more
effective when provided in small, community-based programs rather
than in large, isolated institutions. For example, in 1961 the Joint
Commission on Mental Illness and Health 16 recommended that
action be taken to both improve conditions in state hospitals 7 and
develop community alternatives to state hospitals.'
Furthermore,
Congress, courts, and states called for deinstitutionalization and the
development of community programs for people with mental illness
and developmental disabilities.' As a result, the number of people
with mental disabilities in institutions has dwindled during the past
two decades. 0
But the community mental health and deinstitutionalization
movements of the 1960s and 1970s have not yet realized their
potential. Although most people labeled mentally disabled may no

14. See Rhoden, supra note 5, at 388 (reviewing criticism of community residences and
concluding that many are located within "decayed" urban areas).
15. See Peter Margulies, The Newest EqualProtection: City of Cleburne and a Common Lawfor
Statutes and CovenantsAffecting GroupHomesfor the Mentally Disabled,3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN.
359, 360 (1986) (recounting how "[u]ntil the 1960s, [the mentally disabled] were confined in
large state institutions, and suffered under complementary regimes of brutality and neglect")
(footnote omitted).
16. The Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health was a quasi-governmental,
interdisciplinary body whose members were chosen by the National Institute of Mental Health.
Its mandate was to assess the Nation's mental health needs and develop methods of meeting
those needs. The Commission published its recommendations in JOINT COMM'N ON MENTAL
ILLNESS AND HEALTH, AcION FOR MENTAL HEALTH (1961).
17. JOINT COMM'N ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACrION FOR MENTAL HEALTH xvi

(1961).
18. Id. at xiv.
19. See Rhoden, supra note 5, at 383, 385-87 (noting that "[o]nce deinstitutionalization
became a recognized social policy, legislatures acted to aid and encourage it" and discussing
importance of "judicial preference for community treatment" in facilitating
deinstitutionalization).
20. See Stephen L. Mikochik, Advancing Deinstitutionalization,65 N.D. L. REv. 143, 143
(1989) (describing shift of "countless retarded persons" from institutions to community
residences); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 378 (describing decline in institutional populations due
to deinstitutionalization as "massive").
21. See Rhoden, supra note 5, at 402 (highlighting increase in "pace of
deinstitutionalization" in 1960s and 1970s); Leslie H. Powers, Note, Less Equal than Others:
Personswith MentalRetardation,EqualProtectionand Deinstitutionalization,15 NEW ENG.J. ON CRIM.
& Civ. CONINEMENT 81, 83 (1989) (noting that "1960's and 1970's brought a renewed interest
in the fate of the mentally retarded population").
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longer be subjected to the egregious mistreatment and abuse that
characterized earlier decades, they still suffer from stigmatization and
discrimination.2 2 They are viewed as unwelcome intruders in most
communities, as evidenced by the large number of court cases
brought to keep group homes for people with mental disabilities out
of single-family neighborhoods.3
Certainly, the civil rights revolution of the 1960s had a marked
effect on the rights of people with disabilities in general24 and
people with mental disabilities in particular.' A national policy of
deinstitutionalization has allowed many individuals to leave state
mental hospitals and training centers.
Yet, despite years of this
national policy, people with mental disabilities have not been truly
integrated into our communities.
One explanation for the continued segregation of people labeled
mentally disabled is the historic lack of federal leadership and
financial resources. By some accounts, the Federal Government has
actively promoted, or at least permitted, the segregation of people
with mental disabilities. 2' For example, prior to the enactment of
the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act of 1963,29 the Federal Government

22. See Margulies, supra note 15, at 387 ("Fear of this vulnerable population is still
commonplace ....
Hostility and distrust of the mentally disabled currently are most pervasive
in the area of housing."); Perlin, supra note 6, at 138 (arguing that "social attitudes" about
homeless mentally ill are "born in bias [and] honed by the thoughtless acceptance of
stereotypes").
23. See Arlene S. Kanter, Recent Zoning Cases Uphold the Establishment of Group Homes for the
Mentally Disabled, 18 CLE.ARINGHOUSE REv. 515 (1984) (reviewing court decisions involving use
of local zoning laws to prevent establishment of community residences); Salsich, supra note 2,
at 422-23 & n.50 (noting legal challenges to attempts to include group homes within zoning
definition of "family").
24. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 132 (1990) ("In the 1960's the rhetoric of equal rights appeared in declarations
for women, for children, and ultimately for persons with disabilities.") (footnotes omitted).
25. See Margulies, supra note 15, at 361.
26. Seesupranote 20.
27. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 15, at 362 (noting difficulty that mentally handicapped
have in acquiring housing in communities); Rhoden, supra note 5, at 391 (discussing
"transinstitutionalization" where "patient often moves from one inadequate environment to the
next").
28. Cf James A. Kushner, The Role ofthe FederalGovernment, in THE FAIR HOUSING Aar AFTER
TWENY YEARS 48, 48 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989) (arguing that "federal government's
historically dominant role in segregating the nation, resisting the dismantlement of apartheid,
and ignoring pervasive patterns of housing discrimination eclipses [previous] largely symbolic
efforts").
29. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963), repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e) (2) (B), 95 Stat. 357, 560.
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provided neither the leadership nor the financial resources necessary
for the development of community living options.3"
The Federal Government eventually made some efforts to provide
leadership and the resources needed to integrate people with mental
disabilities into residential neighborhoods. Congress attempted to
create an alternative to institutionalization, for example, by amending
the Medicaid program to reimburse states for certain home- or
community-based services for people with mental disabilities."1
Federal agencies also have begun to fund demonstration projects to
promote successful models for housing for people with special
needs.32 Further, twenty years after the passage of the first Fair
Housing Act, Congress finally passed the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988"s to prohibit housing discrimination against people with
disabilities.
A second explanation for the continued segregation of people with
mental disabilities is the complacency, and even complicity, of state
and local governments in regard to discrimination against people with
mental disabilities. Most state and local governments have failed to

30.

SeePHILBROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE: PSYcHIATRIC DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS

AFTERMATH 43 (1985) (describing Act as "first time that a federal program provided ongoing
support for a nationwide health service program"). Under the Act, Community Mental Health
Centers (CMHCs) were eligible to receive federal funding if they offered certain services,
including inpatient care, outpatient care, emergency services, partial hospitalization, consultation, and education. Id. at 42. The Act envisioned a nationwide network of CMHCs providing
comprehensive services and individual case management for areas of 75,000 to 200,000 people.
Id. It also urged coordination between federal, state, and local health planning agencies, welfare
departments, and urban renewal agencies. Id. Yet of the 2500 CMHCs anticipated by the Act,
fewer than 700 have been built, serving less than half of the nation. 2 TASK PANEL REPORTS,
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH 319 (1978).

31. In 1981, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2176, 2177(a),
95 Star. 357, 812-13 (1981), amended the Medicaid statute to provide a new funding source for
medical and nonmedical community services as alternatives to institutions. The Community
Services Waiver Provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c), allows states to apply for a waiver of certain
Medicaid requirements in order to offer home- and community-based services. To qualify for
the waiver, a state must show that the services are needed by certain individuals to avoid
institutional care. Id. § 1396n(c) (1). The state must establish that "but for the provision of such
services the individuals would require the level of care provided in a hospital or skilled nursing
facility or intermediate care facility, the cost of which would be reimbursed under the state
[Medicaid] plan." Id. But the Health Care Financing Agency responsible for administering
Medicaid has refused to approve such Medicaid waivers to states seeking to expand Medicaid
services or to shift to Medicaid the cost of existing services. See Arlene S. Kanter, Homeless
Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight and Out of Mind, 3 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. 331, 344
(1986).
32. See Community Investment Corporation Demonstration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a)(5)
(1988) (authorizing reimbursement for removal of barriers to mobility and accessibility to
handicapped and elderly).
33. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Star. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2342 (1988)).
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fund innovative quality housing adequately' and have succumbed to
the prejudices and fears of potential neighbors by enacting and
enforcing exclusionary zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants.3 5
Providers of services to people with mental disabilities also must
share some of the blame in promoting segregation of people with
mental disabilities. These providers continue to view housing as part
of the service continuum rather than as a person's "home." Service
providers have developed housing programs based on general models,
often without giving attention to individual needs or desires.3 8
Group homes and other "congregate living facilities" have been
viewed as the best alternative to institutionalization." Such homes,
however, are often simply an extension of the institutions left behind.
Group homes, halfway houses, quarterway houses, and board and care
homes are hardly "homes" at all. Like institutions, they segregate
people with disabilities and confine them with little, if any, attention
to individual choice.38 The residents of such homes are seldom
asked where or with whom they want to live.3 9
The language surrounding deinstitutionalization reveals the lack of
emphasis on individual choice. The places where people with mental
disabilities have lived are called "congregate living facilities,""
"community residences,"4 1 "residential living environments,"4 2

34. See Durham, supranote 5, at 128 (noting increasing pressure on policymakers to reverse
process of integrating mentally ill into communities); see also Salsich, supra note 2, at 417
(describing reaction of neighbors to influx of mentally disabled into neighborhood as NIMBY,
or Not in My Back Yard, syndrome).
35. See Margulies, supra note 15, at 363 (noting that many cities and towns have zoning
ordinances that exclude persons with mental disabilities); Salsich, supra note 2, at 429 (arguing
that restrictive covenants can prevent successful implementation of state policies favoring
deinstitutionalization of persons with mental disabilities).
36. SeeJulie A. Racino et al., Introduction,in HOUSING, SUPPORT, AND COMMUNITY: CHOICES
AND STRATEGIES FOR ADULTS WrrH DISABITmS 1-3 Gulie A. Racino et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
HOUSING, SUPPORT, AND COMMUNITY].

37. See Margulies, supranote 15, at 363 (stating that "[s]mall congregate facilities in the
community with resident staff are the[] best alternative to institutionalization or homelessness"
for people with mental disabilities); Salsich, supra note 2, at 416 (noting that "centerpiece of
[the deinstitutionalization] effort is the group home").
38. See Susan O'Connor &Julie A. Racino, "A Home ofMy Own": Community HousingOptions
and Strategies, in HOUSING, SUPPORT, AND COMMUNITY, supra note 36, at 137-38.
39. SeeJulie A. Racino & Pamela Walker, "Whose Life Is It Anyway?": Life Planning,Choices,
and Decision Making, in HOUSING, SUPPORT, AND COMMUNITY, supra note 36, at 57.
40. For examples of statutes using "congregate living facilities" to describe housing for the
deinstitutionalized mentally ill, see FLA. STAT. ch. 400.401 (1990 & Supp. 1992); RI. GEN. LAWS
§ 40.1-25-2 (1990).
41. For examples of statutes using "community residences" to describe housing for
deinstitutionalized mentally ill, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-3E (1989 & Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 32-1301 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:26 (1990); NJ. REV. STAT. § 30:11B-1
(1981 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.33 (McKinney 1988).
42. See Crowley v. Knapp, 288 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Wis. 1980) (explaining that purpose of
group home for "retarded citizens" is to provide "residential living environment").
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"community living arrangements," 4 and "community care facilities."" Noticeably absent in these varied descriptions is the simple
word "home."
A home has many meanings-a domicile, a dwelling, or the "focus
of domestic affections."4 5 To most, home simply connotes the place
where one belongs and feels safe. Yet for people with mental
disabilities, a home has been just one more service to accept or
refuse. Where do people with mental disabilities want to live? Have
they ever been asked?46 How can laws be used to help them realize
their own desires?
This Article does not seek to explain or even identify all of the
complex social, legal, political, philosophical, and financial issues
surrounding housing for people with mental disabilities. Nor does
this Article provide solutions to many of the economic, employment,
and health-related challenges now facing people labeled mentally ill
or developmentally disabled. Rather, this Article seeks to trace the
way in which federal and state laws have been used to exclude people
with mental disabilities from living next door to you and me.
Specifically, this Article explores ways to avoid repeating our history
of degrading and dehumanizing people with mental disabilities by
denying them the basic right to live where and how they choose.
II. A HISTORY OF FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

On September 12, 1988, Congress passed the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 47 which amended the Fair Housing Act of
1968,48 to prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities in
public as well as private housing.4 9 The FHAA represents the

43.

For examples of statutes using "community living arrangements" to describe housing

for deinstitutionalized mentally ill, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4832 (West 1984); HAW. REV.

STAT. § 334-103 (1985 & Supp. 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 210, para. 135/10 (1993).
44. For examples of statutes using "community care facilities" to describe housing for
deinstitutionalized mentally ill, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4801 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, para. 1705/18.2 (1993).
45.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1082 (1986).

46. See Don Aucoin, Clients Give DMH Some Pointers, BOSTON GLOBE,June 15, 1993, at 17-18
(describing first meeting between members of clubhouse for people with mental illnesses and
representative of State Department of Mental Health in precedent-setting effort by state to
systematically ask mentally ill people which services they need and want).
47. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Star. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2342 (1988)).
48. Pub. L No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat 73, 81-89 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988)).
49. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619,
1621-1622 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988)) (amending Fair Housing Act to include
handicapped as protected class).
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Federal Government's most important step forward in removing
barriers faced by people with disabilities in their effort to live as equal
members of society. Prior to its enactment, no federal law specifically
prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities in private
and public housing. 0 Before discussing the FHAA, however, it is
important to understand the historical context in which it arose. The
following section therefore reviews the federal antidiscrimination laws
that preceded the enactment of the FHAA.
A.

Executive Order 11,063

The first major federal initiative prohibiting housing discrimination
was Executive Order 11,063,51 which President Kennedy signed in
1962.52 This Executive order prohibited discrimination in federally
operated or assisted housing on the basis of race with respect to the
sale, lease, rental, or other disposition of residential property and
related facilities owned, operated, or financially assisted by the Federal
Government. 3
Noticeably absent from the protection of the
Executive order were people with disabilities.
The Attorney General was authorized to bring civil or criminal
actions to remedy violations of rules, regulations, and procedures
issued pursuant to the Executive order upon the recommendation of
an executive department or federal agency 4 The scope of the
order, however, was extremely limited.5 It covered less than one
percent of the nation's housing because most housing was financed
by private lending institutions that were not covered by the Executive
order. 6 In 1968, two events dramatically affected the prohibition
against discrimination in housing: the passage of the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 and the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Afred H.
Mayer Co.," which held that § 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 186658

50. Cf infra Part IIA-D (discussing federal attempts before FHAA to prevent housing
discrimination against people with disabilities).
51. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.FR. 652 (1959-1963), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 101, 3 C.F.R. at 653, rprintedas amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
54. Id. § 303, 3 C.F.R. at 655, repinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
55. LisaJ. Laplace, Note, The Legality ofIntegrationMaintenanceQuotas: FairHousingorForced
Housing?,55 BROOK. L. REV. 197, 206 n.32 (1989).
56. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAw 23 (1983) (noting that "order
had no application to housing that was conventionally financed"); Robert F. Drinan, Untying the
White Noose, 94 YALE L.J. 435, 437 (1984) (book review) (describing Executive Order 11,063 as
'pathetically weak" because it covered few housing units).
57. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
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protected racial minorities from discrimination in private as well as
public housing.59
B.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968: The FairHousingAct of
1968

Congress expanded the scope and protections of Executive Order
11,063 by enacting the Fair Housing Act of 1968 as title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.' The Fair Housing Act of 1968 established
a system of administrative enforcement, involving the Federal
Government and state and local fair housing agencies,"' and a system
of judicial review.6" The Act created these systems to handle claims
alleging discrimination in housing and housing-related transactions on
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.63

In 1974,

Congress amended the Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
gender as well.' Neither the original Fair Housing Act nor the 1974
amendments, however, prohibited discrimination against people with
disabilities.

The Fair Housing Act of 1968, together with its 1974 amendments,
enunciated, for the first time, "the policy of the United States to
provide within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout

The Act was broader than Executive Order
the United States."'
11,063 because it prohibited discrimination based not only on race
but also on color, religion, national origin, and, eventually, gender.'
Further, the Fair Housing Act reached private 67 as well as public
69
housing' and specifically covered discrimination in financing,
advertising, 70 and brokerage services.7 '

As originally enacted, the

59. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
60. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
25, and 42 U.S.C.).
61. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810, 82 Stat. 73, 85 (1968) (repealed 1988) (creating
procedure by which Secretary of Housing and Urban Development was to consider claims of
housing discrimination, including mandatory deferral to state and local agencies that provide
"substantially equivalent" rights and remedies).
62. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(d) & 812, 82 Stat. 73, 86, 88 (repealed 1988) (providing
civil remedy to enforce Act); id. § 813, 82 Stat. at 88 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 3614
(1988)) (providing for suits by Attorney General to enforce Act).
63. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988) (barring discrimination in sale, rental, financing, and
brokerage of housing on basis of race, color, religion, or national origin).
64. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-383, sec. 527, §
808(b) (3), 88 Stat. 633, 729 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1988)).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
66. Id. §§ 3604-3606.
67. Id. § 3603(a)(1)(B)-(D).
68. Id. § 3603(a) (1) (A), (D).
69. Id. § 3605.
70. Id. § 3604(c).

71. Id. § 3606.
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Fair Housing Act also prohibited practices such as "blockbusting," the
practice of convincing owners to sell property on the grounds that
minorities are about to move into the neighborhood,7 2 and "steering," the practice of directing prospective home buyers into neighborhoods in which members of their racial, ethnic, or religious group
already live.7 3
In short, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 made unlawful all practices
and transactions that would deny housing to members of the
protected groups.74 Like most legislation, the Fair Housing Act was
the result of compromise.7 5 Under the law, "aggrieved persons"
could file complaints with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) alleging the existence of a "discriminatory
housing practice." 76 The Fair Housing Act required HUD to
investigate the complaint within thirty days of receiving it and then to
either pursue or dismiss the complaint. 77 If HUD elected to pursue
the complaint, however, the statute authorized HUD to engage only
in "conference, conciliation and persuasion," not litigation.78 As part
of the compromise that effected passage, sponsors of the bill were
forced to deny HUD a mechanism for enforcing the law's anti79
discrimination provisions relating to the sale or rental of housing.
Consequently, HUD was only left with the power to mediate disputes
between a landlord or seller and individuals who believed that they

72. Id. § 3604(e); see United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.
1973) (describing § 3604(e) as "'anti-blockbusting' provision of the Fair Housing Act").
73. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988); see Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94
(1979).
74. One could argue that the Act was, and continues to be, too selective in its coverage.
The Act, which fails to protect low-income people in general, fails to benefit a large number of
people in need of "fair housing" protection because they are homeless or forced to live in
substandard housing. According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's
(HUD) own figures, one in five poor people are forced to live in substandard housing. EJ.
Dionne,Jr., PoorPayingMorefor TheirShelter,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1989, at A18. Yet, the Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution does not create a right to housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 74 (1972), and that discrimination against poor people does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977).
75. See Robert G. Schwemm, The Limits ofLitigationUnder the FairHoauingAct of 1968,in THE
FAIR HOUSING AcT AFrER TWENTY YEARS, supra note 28, at 43, 44 (describing "Dirksen
Compromise," which eliminated ability of HUD to issue cease and desist orders and "result[ed]
in an agency procedure that provides for absolutely no sanctions against a recalcitrant
defendant").
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f) (1988) (defining acts unlawful under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606,
3617 (1988) as discriminatory housing practices).
77. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810, 82 Stat. 73, 85 (repealed 1988).
78. See id. (requiring "informal methods" of dispute resolution).
79. See Schwemm, supra note 75, at 44-45. In the original bill that later became the Fair
Housing Act, HUD had the power to order property owners to "cease and desist" discriminatory
practices. Id. This power was eliminated in the final version of the Act in an effort to garner
more support for the Act's passage. Id.
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had suffered discrimination. Although the Department ofJustice was
authorized to bring suits against offending landowners, 0 its hands
were tied as well. Under the original law, the Department of Justice
could bring suit only to remedy an established pattern or practice of
discrimination."
From 1968 to 1988, criticism of the law focused principally on its
lack of enforcement.82 In fact, one commentator characterized the
83
term "federal fair housing enforcement effort" as an oxymoron.
Commentators have claimed that the statutory limits to HUD's
enforcement powers have limited the law's potential. 4 Critics of the
Fair Housing Act also viewed its $1000 cap on punitive damages 5 as
too low to serve as a deterrent. 6 Finally, commentators considered
the Act's reliance on private enforcement to7 attack patterns of
8
discrimination and segregation as unworkable.
The failings of the Fair Housing Act were not limited to its
remedial scheme. One of the most significant limitations of the
original version of the Act was that it exempted a large percentage of
the Nation's housing units. For example, the Act did not cover
transactions relating to the sale of single-family homes that did not
involve a broker or commercial advertising,' accommodations
provided by private clubs, 89 noncommercial housing operated by

80. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 813, 82 Stat. 73, 88 (repealed 1988).
81. Id. Under the original Fair Housing Act, plaintiffs could bring suits for equitable relief
or damages. Id. § 810(d), 82 Stat. at 86. Overall administration of the Act, however, was and
remains the responsibility of HUD, which has authority to investigate and conciliate complaints
of housing discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608a, 3608c (1988). Both the original Act and current
law authorize the Attorney General to litigate on behalf of private persons where there is an
established pattern or practice of housing discrimination and to obtain actual and punitive
damages and injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b) (1988).
82. See Kushner, supra note 28, at 48-52.
83. Kushner, supranote 28, at 48.
84. See Kushner, supra note 28, at 48 (stating that "[c]ritiques of the federal fair housing
enforcement effort invariably focus on the incredibly low numbers of cases and complaints
handled" by HUD and Department ofJustice); Schwemm, supra note 75, at 44 (criticizing Fair
Housing Act for restricting HUD's enforcement powers).
85. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L No. 90-284, § 812(c), 82 Stat. 73, 88 (1968).
86. See Schwemm, supra note 75, at 46 (arguing that punitive damages cap "serves to protect
the most egregious violators from feeling the full force of an appropriate judgment").
87. See Schwemm, supra note 75, at 45-47 (discussing "serious drawbacks" of reliance on
private enforcement including lack of citizen knowledge about rights protected by Fair Housing
Act and lack of economic incentive to pursue private litigation). See generally ROBERT G.
SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LrrIGATION 1-1 to 26-30 (1993) (discussing

litigation under Fair Housing Act). A further limitation in the original version of the law
provided that "aggrieved persons" who decided to bring suit themselves were denied court costs
and attorneys fees unless a court concluded that the petitioner was financially unable to assume
payment of the attorneys fees. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812(c), 82 Stat.
73, 88 (repealed 1988).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1) (1988).
89. Id. § 3607(a).
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religious groups, 90 and owner-occupied rental housing containing
units.91 These exemptions remain in effect under the
four or fewer 92
amended Act

Despite, or perhaps because of, these limitations, the Fair Housing
Act has spurred some litigation and much debate. Some commentators may claim that the Act has had the dramatic effect of integrating
neighborhoods, while others claim that segregation and discrimina-

tion in housing remain as prevalent today as in years past.93 One
fact, however, remains beyond dispute. Without the Fair Housing Act
of 1968, states, localities, and individuals would have felt even greater
freedom to discriminate against people covered by the
Act 9 4-- perhaps in the way that they have felt free to discriminate
against people with disabilities, who are not even mentioned in the
95
Act.

C. Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides that "[a]ll
citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every state
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."96
In 1968, just two months after Congress enacted the original Fair
97
Housing Act, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
that racial discrimination in real estate transactions violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.98
The Court in Mayerdistinguished § 1982 from the Fair Housing Act
of 1968. 9 Unlike the Fair Housing Act, § 1982 creates a private
90. Id.
91. Id. § 3603(b)(2).
92. Id. §§ 3603(b)(I)-(2), 3607(a).
93.

See Guido Calabresi, Preface; in THE FAIR HOUSING Acr AFrER TWENTYYEARS, supranote

28, at 7, 8 (describing consensus of participants in Fair Housing Act symposium that "the act has
not met the high expectations its supporters had for it").
94. See Drew S. Days III, Ovendew, in THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AFTER TwENT YEARS, supra
note 28, at 27, 28 (emphasizing failures of federal fair housing effort but conceding that "there
have been successes in providing decent homes for many Americans previously denied such
access because of their race or national origin or some other irrelevant characteristic").
95. See supranote 14 and accompanying text (discussing history of housing discrimination
against mentally handicapped). In 1980, the House of Representatives voted to extend the Fair
Housing Act to protect handicapped people, but the bill failed to pass the Senate. See H.R. REP.
NO. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. 2173, 2175.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
97. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
98. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436-37 (1968). According to the Supreme
Court, § 1982 is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to
eliminate the "badges and incidents of slavery [including] all racial discrimination in private as
well as public housing." Id. at 413.
99. Id. at 413-17.
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right of action and therefore does not require enforcement action by
a federal agency."° Further, punitive damages may be awarded
under § 1982,"' whereas they were not available under the original
Fair Housing Act. Section 1982, however, protects fewer people than
the Fair Housing Act does: § 1982 applies only to housing discrimination based on race10 2 and does not cover discrimination based on
religion or national origin, which were all covered by the Fair
Housing Act."0 3 Like the Fair Housing Act, § 1982 also does not
address the rights of people with disabilities.
D. Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,10 the first federal law to address
the rights of people with disabilities,0 ' prohibits discrimination
against people with disabilities in a variety of contexts, including
housing."
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to create equal
protection for people with disabilities and considered the measure a
"necessary step toward universal equal rights.1 0 7 As one Senator

100. Se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (creating private cause of action to remedy civil rights
violation).
101. See Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 883, 389 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that "there is no
limit on the amount of punitive damages that can be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1982").
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) (granting all citizens same property rights possessed by
white citizens).
103. See42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988) (barring discrimination in sale, rental, financing, and
brokerage of housing on basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or gender).
104. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-796i (1988).
105. See Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing Rehabilitation
Act as "first major federal statute designed to provide assistance to the whole population of
handicapped persons").
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988) (requiring government contractors to make affirmative
attempts to employ individuals with handicaps in carrying out all federal government contracts
in excess of $2500); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (barring discrimination on basis of handicap in any federal
executive branch or U.S. Postal Service program or in any program receiving federal technical
assistance). Section 504 is patterned after title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
and title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 6373, 6390. It has been referred to as "a part of the
general corpus of discrimination law." U.S. COMM'N ON CAL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE
SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 142 (1983). As one court has observed: "Recognizing the
parallels between the discrimination suffered by the handicapped and other minority groups
manifested particularly through their segregation from the rest of society, members of Congress
sought to combat the problem through a remedy which had proven successful in the past, civil
rights legislation." Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 205 (D.N.H. 1981) (footnote omitted).
107. 124 CONG. REc. 38,552 (1978) (statement of Sen. Cranston). Other proposed titles for
the Rehabilitation Act, such as the "Bill of Rights for Handicapped Persons" and the "Civil
Rights Act for the Handicapped," indicate the importance of § 504 to the legal protection of
persons with handicaps. Id.; see Harold S. Levine, Note, Defining the Rights ofHandicapped Under
Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973: Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 24 ST.
LOUIS U. LJ. 159, 159-60 (1979) (discussing importance of Rehabilitation Act to handicapped
community).
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proclaimed, "The time has come when we can no longer tolerate the
invisibility of the handicapped in America.""0 8
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits essentially all forms
of discrimination against a wide class of people with disabilities; it
applies, however, only to discrimination by federally financed
agencies."°
To bring a successful claim under section 504, a
plaintiff must establish that: (1) the challenged program or activity
receives federal financial assistance;"' (2) she or he is an "individual
with handicaps" under the Act;"' (3) she or he is "otherwise
qualified" for that specific program or activity;" 2 and (4) she or he
was excluded
from the program solely on the ground of her or his
3
handicap."
Section 504's prohibition of discrimination applies to virtually all
persons and entities receiving federal funds in any amount or
form." 4 The purpose of the federal assistance need not be connect-

108. 118 CONG. REC. 525 (1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988) ("No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the
United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."); see also infa note 114 (quoting regulation that
determines applicability of § 504). For example, § 501 is an affirmative action program for
handicapped applicants in federal jobs or employees working for the Federal Government, 29
U.S.C. § 791 (1988), and § 503 requires federal contractors to take affirmative steps to hire
people with handicaps. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
111. Id. The phrase "individual with handicaps" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988).
112. Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981).
113. Id.
114. See 24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1993) (outlining breadth of § 504). HUD's own § 504 regulations
define "recipient" as follows:
[A "recipient" is] any State or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a State or
its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, organization, or other
entity, or any person to which Federal financial assistance is extended for any program
or activity directly or through another recipient, including any successor, assignee, or
transferee of a recipient, but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance. An
entity or person receiving housing assistance payments from a recipient on behalf of
eligible families under a housing assistance payments program or a voucher program
is not a recipient or subrecipient merely by virtue of receipt of such payments.
Id. Only three categories of recipients are exempt: (1) ultimate beneficiaries of federal
assistance programs, such as Social Security recipients, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 note (1988); (2)
recipients of government procurement contracts who, in return for supplying goods to the
government, receive payments rather than financial assistance, 24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1993); and (3)
recipients of insurance or guaranty contracts. Id.
"Federal financial assistance" is defined as follows:
[A]ny assistance provided or otherwise made available by the Department through any
grant, loan, contract or any other arrangement, in the form of:
(a) Funds;
(b) Services of Federal personnel; or
(c) Real or personal property or any interest in or use of such property, including.
(1) Transfers or leases of the property for less than fair market value or for reduced
consideration; and
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ed to the alleged discriminatory activity." 5 In the housing area,
nonprofit organizations that construct or substantially rehabilitate
rental housing for people with mental disabilities are common
recipients of federal financial assistance for housing development
under section 202 of the National Housing Act.11 6 In 1982, for
example, a federal district court in NewJersey held that plaintiffs with
mental illness seeking restitution for alleged housing discrimination
under section 202 had a cognizable claim under section 504 of the
117
Rehabilitation Act
Two additional housing programs for people with mental disabilities
are also subject to section 504's prohibition against discrimination:
(1) the assisted housing program of the United States Housing Act of
1937, which provides rent subsidies for a wide variety of existing

(2) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of the property if the Federal share
of its fair market value is not returned to the Federal Government.
Fe&ralfinancialassistanceincludes community development funds in the form of
proceeds from loans guaranteed under section 108 of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, as amended, [42 U.S.C. § 5308 (1988) ] but does not include
assistance made available through direct Federal procurement contracts or payments
made under these contracts or any other contract of insurance or guaranty.
24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1992).
115. See Glanz v. Vemick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Mass. 1991) (rejecting claim that § 504
does not apply where federal funds are not used to discriminate); cf. Grove City College v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555, 571 n.21 (1984) (applying federal discrimination protection to all activities of
program receiving federal funds); United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 104749 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying § 504 to all hospital programs receiving Medicare and Medicaid
payments), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
116. 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (1988). Under § 202, HUD may issue long-term, low-interest loans
to eligible developers seeking to provide housing for elderly or handicapped persons with
incomes insufficient to pay for private rental rates. Id.
117. Edge v. Pierce, 540 F. Supp. 1300, 1303-05 (D.N.J. 1982); see also Dempsey v. Ladd, 840
F.2d 638, 639-41 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding decision to exclude mentally disabled residents
from § 202 housing project); Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1356
(10th Cir. 1987) (upholding summaryjudgment in favor of landlord who had refused to admit
chronically mentally and developmentally disabled persons to federally funded housing project);
Brecker v. Queens B'nai B'rith Hous. Dev. Fund, 798 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding
landlord's decision to provide housing to one § 202-eligible group but not others); Almonte v.
Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (limiting application of § 202 to individuals that
are "mobility impaired").
Although these cases were decided before the effective date of the FHAA, they have now been
codified in title VI of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102550, §§ 601-685, 106 Stat. 3672, 3802-32 (codified at scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 1993)). At first glance, this new law appears to benefit people with disabilities;
however, its segregated approach to housing is discriminatory. Title VI of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992 provides that, in certain circumstances, public and
subsidized housing units must be reserved for elderly and disabled residents. 42 U.S.CA. §§
13611-13612 (West Supp. 1993). The FHAA seeks to promote the inclusion of people with
disabilities into nonsegregated housing, without regard to their disabilities. The effect of title
VI is to create segregated disabled-only or disabled and elderly-only housing, which would
contravene the very purpose and language of the FHAA . The proposed HUD regulations
implementing title VI have not yet been issued, and advocates for people with disabilities are
hopeful that the regulations will ameliorate the effect of the law on limiting integrated housing
opportunities for people with disabilities. See HOUSING L BULL,Jan.-Apr. 1993, at 1, 1-6.
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housing options;"" and (2) HUD's assistance to mentally disabled
persons in general low-income housing programs." 9 Although both
programs provide federal assistance directly to the eligible resident
with a disability rather than to the sponsor or manager of the housing
project, Grove City College v. Bell 2W supplies the judicial precedent
necessary to apply section 504's prohibition.
In Grove City College, the Supreme Court defined the scope of
"federal financial assistance"12' to include any specific program
within a college, for example, that accepts no direct federal assistance
but that enrolls students who receive federal grants earmarked for
educational purposes. 22 Thus, under Grove City, a tenant who
receives federal financial assistance is protected against discrimination
under section 504.
Congress further clarified the scope of the "federal financial
assistance" requirement in 1988 when it amended section 504. This
amendment makes clear that where a part of an institution or
program receives federal financial assistance, the entire institution or
2
Thus, if a landlord
program is prohibited from discriminating.1'
a victim of that
then
or seller receives federal financial assistance,
individual's discrimination may sue under both the FHAA and section
504. If the landlord or seller received no federal financial assistance,
and the resident did not receive financial assistance directly from the
Federal Government, the resident would be able to sue only under
the FHAA.
Although the intent of the Rehabilitation Act was to eliminate and
provide redress for acts of discrimination against people with
disabilities, the Act has been criticized for having loopholes and
problems, particularly in regard to housing discriminaenforcement
124
tion.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988) (implementing § 8 lower-income housing assistance generally);
id. § 1437f(p) (implementing shared housing for elderly and handicapped).
119. See SAMuELJ. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 667 (3d ed. 1985)
(discussing courts' use of § 504 to protect mentally disabled persons from discrimination in
federally assisted housing projects despite HUD's failure to issue regulations to fully implement
statute).
120. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
121. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
122. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-74 (1984) (stating that although federal
financial aid to specific program will not "trigger institutionwide coverage," specific program is
covered).
123. Rehabilitation Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 100-259, sec. 4, § 504, 102 Stat. 29 (1988)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1988)).
124. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 18, 28-29 (1988), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179,
2189-90 (discussing loopholes in original Act's coverage of handicapped and stating that FHAA
requirements prohibiting discriminatory housing practices against handicapped persons were
based heavily on § 504 case law developed primarily in employment and services context).
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THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS AcT OF 1988 AND
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES

Twenty years after the passage of the original Fair Housing Act,
Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 in
response to housing discrimination against people with disabilities and
the lack of enforcement of the original Act." The FHAA expanded the coverage of the Fair Housing Act by prohibiting all forms of
126
housing discrimination based on handicap and familial status.
The FHAA also strengthened the Fair Housing Act's enforcement
mechanisms by providing HUD with the power to refer cases involving
breaches of conciliation agreements to the Department of Justice.127
Further, the FHAA prohibits discrimination in certain transactions
that were not included in the original Fair Housing Act, such as the
sale, rental, financing, brokering, appraising, making,128and purchasing
of loans for dwellings, and local land-use decisions.
The FHAA also directed the Secretary of HUD to issue regulations
129
implementing the Fair Housing Amendments Act within 180 days,
which the Secretary did,"' but not without a battle. When the
Secretary published notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register in November 1988,11 disability-rights advocates and real
estate developers immediately criticized the proposed rule. 2 HUD

125. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 15, 18, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2176, 2179
(discussing lack of effective enforcement mechanism in existing law and rising awareness of
problems of accessibility and "erroneous beliefs about their abilities" faced by disabled).
126. SeeH.R. REP. No. 711, supm note 95, at 17-21, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2178-82 (discussing
rationale for FHAA coverage of handicapped and families with children). This Article only
addresses the effect of the FHAA on people with mental disabilities.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1988). Ifconciliation fails, HUD has the power to seek injunctive
relief in federal court or to file an administrative complaint before an administrative law judge
(AIJ). 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(e), 3612 (1988). The ALJ can issue injunctive relief or impose
penalties of up to $50,000, depending on the number of violations. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3)
(1988).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 29, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2191 (elaborating on congressional intent not to "restrict or prohibit the legitimate
consideration of actual obligations in caring for children" when evaluating individuals'
qualification for mortgage).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 note (1988).
130. HUD had not always been so prompt. For example, HUD took 15 years to issue its final
regulations implementing § 504's prohibition against discrimination in federally assisted housing.
See Nondiscrimination Based on Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs and Activities of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,233 (1988) (codified at 24
C.F.R. § 8 (1993)). Coincidentally, the § 504 regulations were promulgatedjust months before
the final FHAA regulations. Implementation of Fair Housing Amendments Act, 54 Fed. Reg.
3232 (1989) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100, 103-106, 109-110, 115, 121 (1993)).
131. Fair Housing, Implementation of Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,53 Fed. Reg.
44,992 (1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100, 103-106, 109-110, 115, 121) (proposed Nov.
7, 1988).
132. One source of dispute was the effective date of the FHAA regulations. According to
HUD, the regulations were to apply only to complaints filed after March 12,1989, and then only
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received over 6500 comments in response to the proposed rule,
33
approximately 4000 of which were critical of the regulations.
Amid the storm of controversy, HUD published its final FHAA
regulations on January 23, 1989,'" and reiterated the purpose of
the Act, stating, "No person shall, on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, be subjected to
discrimination in the sale, rental, or advertising of dwellings, in the
or in the availability of residential real
provision of brokerage services,
35
estate-related transactions."
The constitutional authority for the FHAA is different from the
authority for the original Fair Housing Act. Soon after Congress
passed the original Act in 1968, the Supreme Court held in Jones v.
Alfred E. Mayer Co.' 36 that racial discrimination in housing falls under
the rubric of "badges and incidents of slavery" and that Congress
therefore had the power to enact the Fair Housing Act under the
Thirteenth Amendment.1 3 7 Because the FHAA goes beyond race to
include disability, the Thirteenth Amendment is not sufficient
authority for the Act. Instead, the FHAA appears to derive its
constitutional authority from the Commerce Clause, 38 which has

if the complaint pertained to violations that occurred or continued after that date. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 103.1(b)(2) (1993). If a complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the statute, even if
the violation continued after the effective date, the complainant would have the option to
proceed under either the new or the old rules. 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.1(b)(2), 103.40(c) (1993).
Parties whose complaints were pending as of the effective date of the Act were not able to
benefit from the new statutory remedies. Further, parties who brought complaints after the
FHAA's effective date but whose claims accrued prior to the effective date were unable to take
advantage of the new procedures. This interpretation of the Act's effective date has been
criticized as unduly restrictive and inconsistent with the intent of Congress. See Memorandum
for Childrens' Defense Fund Concerning Summary of Comments of the Childrens' Defense
Fund on the Proposed Regulations to Implement the Fair Housing Amendments Act (Dec. 5,
1988) (on file with The American University Law Review) (discussing HUD's request for comments
on whether proper effective date for FHAA's transition provisions should be FHAA's enactment
date or effective date).
133. Interview with Bonnie Milstein, Staff Attorney, Mental Health Law Project, in
Washington, D.C. (July 12, 1989).
134. Implementation of Fair Housing Amendments Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232 (1989) (codified
at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100, 103-106, 109-110, 115, 121 (1993)).
135. 24 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (1993). The regulations exempt certain religious organizations and
private clubs, as well as housing for older persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). Further, the
regulations make clear that nothing in the Act, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to the sale or rental by an owner of certain single-family houses without
the use of a real estate broker or to the rental of rooms in owner-occupied dwellings containing
living quarters occupied by no more than four families. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
136. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
137. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-43 (1968); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII (abolishing slavery in United States); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1883) (discussing
self-executing nature of Thirteenth Amendment and Congress' power to pass legislation under
it).
138. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Guest Justice
Brennan suggests that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could also provide the necessary
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broad reach and empowers Congress to regulate any commerce that
"concerns more States than one and has a real and substantial
relation to the national interest."" 9 Discrimination in housing
against groups protected by the Fair Housing Amendments Act may
burden interstate commerce by making housing unavailable in certain
areas, thereby discouraging certain citizens from moving to those
areas. Housing discrimination may also burden interstate commerce
by restricting the transportation of goods related to housing construction. In short, housing discrimination against people with mental
disabilities would likely prevent interstate travel by people protected
by the FHAA and thereby adversely affect interstate commerce."
A.

A ComparativeAnalysis of the Coverage of the FairHousing

Amendments Act of 1988 and the RehabilitationAct of 1973
1.

Definition of "handicap"

The FHAA House Report states unequivocally the purpose of the
FHAA.
[The FHAA] is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment
to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from
the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereotypes and
ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities and
unfounded speculations about threats 4 1to safety are specifically
rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.

authority for the FHAA. United States v. Guest, 883 U.S. 745, 774 (1966) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Gues4 Justice Brennan stated that Congress may act as "reasonably necessary to
protect a right created by and arising under" the Fourteenth Amendment, including the Equal
Protection Clause. Id.at 782. He argued that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was a "positive
grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in fashioning remedies
to achieve civil and political equality for all citizens." Id. at 784.
139. See Heart of Atianta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1964). In this case
the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in public accommodations affecting commerce.
Id. at 242-43. The Supreme Court upheld the statute as a proper exercise of Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 250. The Court explained that racial discrimination in
public accommodations burdened interstate commerce by impeding the interstate travel of
citizens. Id. at 252-53. The same argument is appropriate to support the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988.
140. See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 761 F. Supp. 1528, 1545-46 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(upholding FHAA under Commerce Clause in case involving unsuccessful challenge to FHAA's
ban on familial discrimination by elderly residents of age-restricted housing). But see Michigan
Protection & Advocacy Servs. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that
although Commerce Clause may provide sufficient constitutional authority to prohibit
discrimination in housing in some instances, it does not extend to case involving restrictive
covenant between two neighbors where brokers and interstate travel were not involved).
141. H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 18, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
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Accordingly, the FHAA extends protection to people who are
considered "handicapped," which is defined as broadly in the FHAA
as in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act define "handicapped" as "any person who
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities; has a record of such an impairment; or is
regarded as having such an impairment."'
The FHAA ensures that both AIDS sufferers and other individuals
with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) are considered
The FHAA's coverage of HIV and
"individuals with handicaps."'
AIDS is consistent with the Department of Justice's interpretation of
the Rehabilitation Act' 45 and with the Supreme Court's decision in
School Board v. Arline.'4 6 In Arline, the Supreme Court held "that a
person with a record of a physical impairment [who] is also contaIn
gious" is not necessarily excluded from section 504's scope.'
the housing context, a landlord cannot evict or refuse to rent or sell
to an individual unless reasonable accommodation of any risk to the
health and safety of others would be impossible.'4 8
The coverage of the FHAA is extremely broad and many nondisabled people, in addition to people with disabilities, have standing
to sue under the law.'49 For example, not only can a buyer or

142. H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 17, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2178.
143. 24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1993); see 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988) (amending of "handicapped"
provided in original codification). The FHAA definition, which appears at 42 U.S.C. § 3602
(1988), includes essentially the same definition of "handicap" that applies in § 504. 54 Fed. Reg.
3232, 3245 (1989). Section 504 is intended to cover the widest possible range of disabilities that
limit activities such as walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. See
24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1993). It also includes as many impairments as possible, including a range of
physiological disorders and conditions such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional and mental illness, orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, autism,
epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cerebral palsy, diabetes, cancer, heart disease,
drug addiction, and alcoholism. Id.
144. See Baxter v. Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 730 (S.D. Il.1989) (interpreting FHAA to
include HIV carriers as "individuals with handicaps").
145. SeeApplication of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals, 12
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264, 264-65 (1988) (concluding that § 504 protects HIV-infected
individuals from discrimination in nonemployment as well as employment context).
146. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
147. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987). In Arline, the Court ruled that a person
who poses a significant risk of infecting others in the workplace will not be considered otherwise
qualified for the job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk of infection. See
id. at 287-88 (discussing factors to use in evaluating risk of contagion).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 25, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2186 (stating that
FHAA "makes it illegal to refuse to make reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices,
or services if necessary to permit a person with handicaps equal opportunity to use and enjoy
a dwelling").
149. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 15-16, 19-21, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2176-77,
2180-81 (discussing FHAA coverage of minorities and families with children). In addition to
covering persons with handicaps, the FHAA adds familial status to the list of classes protected

1994]

FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS Acr OF 1988

947

renter who has a disability sue, but the buyer's or renter's family
members, roommates, housing providers, or any other person
associated with the buyer or renter may also sue under the FHAA.150
In addition, it is unlawful to refuse to rent or sell to a person who has
a record of being disabled or who is perceived as being disabled.'
This prohibition is significant for people with mental disabilities
because people labeled mentally ill are often regarded by others as
"handicapped" because of certain behaviors that result from their
conditions.'5 2 Such behaviors may lead an observer to conclude
that the individual is mentally ill and to treat him or her differently
as a result. Such treatment, however, is proscribed by the FHAA, as

by its antidiscrimination provision. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988). The Act, however, does contain
exemptions from this antidiscrimination provision for three types of housing for older persons:
(a) subsidized housing for older persons; (b) housing in which all of the occupants are 62 years
of age or older;, and (c) housing in which no fewer than 80% of the dwellings have at least one
resident who is 55 years of age or older. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b) (1988).
The purpose of the exemptions is to accommodate the interests of senior citizens who choose
to live in specialized housing that is "tailored to their specific needs." H.R. REP. No. 711, supra
note 95, at 21, 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2182. Additionally, the exceptions protect surviving spouses
who are under the age of 55 from being evicted when a resident over 55 leaves the unit because
of death or disability. See 134 CONG. REc. H6498 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Edwards) (discussing merits of exceptions for housing for elderly).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2) (1988). Such broad standing is provided in the context of race
discrimination under the original Fair Housing Act as well. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100-09 (1979) (holding that indirect victims of discrimination can sue
under Fair Housing Act). In 1982, the Court went even further and held that a tester-a person
who poses as a buyer or renter in order to detect housing discrimination-who had been the
object of discriminatory misrepresentation could prevail. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 373-75 (1982). The Court declared that testers enjoy a "legal right to truthful
information about available housing," id. at 373, because the law makes it illegal to misrepresent
"to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not
available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available." Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1982)). White parents of a black child were also allowed to sue for racial
discrimination in housing. See Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055,
1056 (7th Cir. 1972) (stating that African-American child's white parents' claim of discriminatory
misrepresentation was not frivolous); see also Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v.
Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing courts' "broad reading
of the FHAA in order to fulfill its remedial purpose"); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d
24, 27 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that Congress "intended standing under [FHAA] to extend to full
limits of Article III"), cert. dnied 498 U.S. 980 (1990), and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
151. 24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1993); id. § 100.201(d). The FHAA and § 504 regulations include
within their definitions of "being regarded as having such an impairment" an individual who:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit one or
more major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a
limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others towards such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in ... this section but is treated by a
recipient as having such an impairment.
Id. § 8.3(d); see also id. § 100.201(d) (FHAA regulations).
152. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 22, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183 (stating that
people discriminated against by others who perceived them to be drug users, but who were not,
were covered by Act).
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well as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits
discriminatory actions against people who are perceived as handiFurther, the FHAA prohibits a landlord from refusing
capped.'
to rent to someone whom he or she believes to be a former patient
54
in a mental hospital or whom he or she believes has AIDS.
Despite the breadth of its coverage, the FHAA does not protect all
people with handicaps. For example, the FHAA specifically excludes
users of illegal drugs and people155addicted to controlled substances
from the definition of handicap.
2.

The "otherwise qualified" and "solely by reason of her or his
handicap" requirements
Before HUD issued its FHAA regulations, the Supreme Court in

Southeastern Community College v. DaviS155 interpreted the phrase

"otherwise qualified handicapped individual" in section 504 of the
57
According to the Court, "An otherwise
Rehabilitation Act.Y
qualified person is one who meets all of a program's requirements in
spite of his handicap."'5 8 An individual may be "otherwise qualified"
without meeting all of a program's requirements, however, if a refusal

153. See, e.g., Carter v. Orleans Parish Pub. Sch., 725 F.2d 261, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that § 504 covered students excluded from federally funded programs because they
were perceived as handicapped although they were not).
154. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 18, 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2179.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(3) (1988). The legislative history makes clear that the FHAA
protects people who are in the process of recovering from drug addiction by participating in a
treatment or self-help program. H.R REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 22, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2183. The House Report states:
Just like any other person with a disability, such as cancer or tuberculosis, former drugdependent persons do not pose a threat to a dwelling or its inhabitants simply on the
basis of status. Depriving such individuals of housing or evicting them, would
constitute irrational discrimination that may seriously jeopardize their continued
recovery.
Id.; see United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 919 (4th Cir. 1992)
(upholding recovering addict's right to damages as "handicapped persons" under FHAA).
People who have not recovered from their drug addiction, however, are not protected by the
FHAA. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (3).
Unlike the FHAA, § 504 protects people with drug addictions, even if they are currently and
illegally using drugs. 24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1993). Only individuals whose "current alcohol or drug
abuse would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others" lose protection under
§ 504. Id. Another difference between the FHAA and § 504 is the laws' treatment of
transvestites. While the FHAA excludes transvestites from coverage, 42 U.S.C. § 3602 note
(1988), § 504 does not. See 24 C.F.R. § 8.3 (defining applicable terms of § 504 and omitting
exception for transvestites).
156. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
157. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
158. Id.
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to modify the program to accommodate the handicapped individual
would be unreasonable and discriminatory.'59
The FHAA House Report and the FHAA regulations seek to ensure
that people with disabilities will not be discriminated against in
housing simply because they have a disability or because they exhibit
certain behaviors. In defining its prohibitions, the FHAA makes clear
that it does not require that a dwelling be made available to an
individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the
health or safety of others or would result in substantial physical
Congress, however, did not
damage to the property of others."
intend for this provision to create or even permit a presumption that
individuals with disabilities generally pose a greater threat to the
16 1
health or safety of others than do individuals without handicaps.
On the contrary, it was added to prohibit discrimination against
people whose unusual behavior may result from their illness and who
pose no danger to others and to "allay fears of those who believe that
the nondiscrimination provisions of this Act could force landlords and
owners to rent or sell to persons whose tenancies could pose such a
risk."' 6
The House Report accompanying the FHAA also states that the
purpose of the provision is to require the landlord or owner to
establish that there is a nexus between the individual's tenancy and
the asserted threat.6 - The nexus must be established by evidence
of past acts or current conduct.'1 As the House Report indicates,
"Generalized assumption, subjective fears, and speculation are
insufficient to prove the requisite direct threat to others." 5
Case law has defined the scope of the FHAA and its prohibition
against treating people with mental disabilities differently from other
people in the context of housing. In Cason v. Rochester Housing
Authority,'" for example, the federal district court for the Western
District of New York invalidated a local public housing authority's
eligibility criteria as violative of the FHAA as well as section 504 of the

159. Id. at 412-13; see Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that individual who did not satisfy hearing requirements for school bus driver's license
was "otherwise qualified" under § 504 and that reasonable accommodation was therefore
necessary).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (9) (1988).
161. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 28, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189.
162. H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 28, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189.
163. H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 18, 1988 U.S.C.CAN. at 2179.
164. H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 18, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
165. H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 19, 1988 U.S.C.CAN. at 2190.
166. 748 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Rehabilitation Act. 7 The plaintiffs in Cason were applicants for
low-income housing who had mental and physical disabilities." s
They claimed that they met all of the eligibility requirements for
housing despite their handicaps and that they were denied housing
only because of an impermissible evaluation of their disabilities,
including an arbitrary and subjective determination of their "ability to
live independently." 9 The court in Cason agreed, finding that the
Rochester Housing Authority's rules for tenancy had the effect of
treating applicants with disabilities differently from "so-called ablebodied applicants."'
Accordingly, the court found that the FHAA
prohibited such inquiries into the nature and severity of a renter or
buyer's disabilities.'
In enacting the FHAA, the court noted,
Congress specifically considered the plight of people with mental
illness. 72 "'In the case of a person with a mental illness ... there

must be objective evidence from the person's prior behavior that the
person has committed overt acts which caused harm or which directly
threatened harm.'"17 3 Yet in this case, all that was presented was
"'unsubstantiated inferences. '" 74

167. Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-07 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
168. Id. at 1004.
169. Id. The "Standards for Tenant Selection Criteria" provided for consideration of the
following(a) an applicant's ability to live independently, or to live independently with minimal
aid; (b) an applicant's past performance in meeting financial obligations, especially
rent, unless good cause can be shown for non-payment of rent; (c) a record of
disturbance of neighbors, destruction of property or of living habits at prior residences
which may adversely affect the health [and safety of other tenants]; (d) a history of
criminal activity involving crimes of physical violence to person or property, or other
criminal acts which would adversely affect the health, safety, and welfare of other
tenants.
Id.
Plaintiffs challenged only the "ability to live independently" provision of the Standards, which
required:
[T]hat an applicant is able to perform those basic functions of adult living for and by
him/her self. These activities include: ability to understand and to sign contracts and
legal agreements, ability to perform basic housekeeping and personal care; ability to
perform necessary daily activities [sic] ability to understand and conform to applicable
standards of safety.
Id.
The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, concluding that the standards unlawfully authorized
detailed inquiries into the nature and scope of the applicant's disabling condition and may have
required the applicant to release confidential medical information. Id. at 1011.
170. Id. at 1003.
171. Id. at 1001.
172. Id. at 1007.
173. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 29, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190).
174. Id. at 1008 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra note 95, at 30, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2191).
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Reasonable accommodation
The FHAA, like section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, provides that
a person with a handicap is entitled to "reasonable accommodation." 7 5 The regulations implementing section 504 define "reasonable accommodation" as follows: "A recipient shall make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified applicant with handicaps or employee with
handicaps, unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its
program."' 76 The regulations provide examples of reasonable
accommodation, but all of these examples are in the employment
context, and none apply to housing. 177 Additionally, none of the
examples involve people with mental, as opposed to physical,
disabilities.'78 Although Congress intended the term "reasonable
accommodation" to provide equality in all aspects of life for people
with disabilities, it has been used primarily in the context of79removing
architectural barriers for people with physical disabilities.
The FHAA regulations, unlike the section 504 regulations,
specifially address the meaning of accommodation in the context of
housing. The FHAA regulations provide that "[i] t shall be unlawful
for any person to refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices or services when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a dwelling unit, including public and common areas."18 °
Yet, none of the examples contained in the FHAA regulations provide
guidance for applying the accommodation requirement to people
3.

175. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3) (B) (1988). In particular, the FHAAstates that"a refusal to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations
may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling" is a
discriminatory housing practice. Id.
176. 24 C.F.R. § 8.11(a) (1993). The phrase "reasonable accommodation" has been
interpreted to mean "adjustments or modification of opportunities to permit handicapped
people to participate fully in society." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 106, at 103.
177. See24 C.F.R. § 8.11(b).
178. See id. Section 8.11(b) provides that "reasonable accommodation may include: (1)
making facilities used by employees accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps; and
(2) job restructuring, job relocation, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisitions or
modification of equipment or devices, the provision of readers or interpreters and other similar
actions." Id.
179. See Charles D. Goldman, ArchitecturalBaniers: A Perspective on Progres, 5 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 465, 478-79 (1983) (discussing requirement that federally funded buildings remove
architectural barriers for people with handicaps).
180. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a) (1993). The examples provided in the regulations refer to a
blind individual who seeks to have his seeing eye dog live with him despite a "no pets" policy
and a mobility-impaired individual who seeks the parking space closest to his apartment unit.
Id.

THE AMERICAN UNIERSIY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:925

with mental disabilities.18 1 Accordingly, people with mental disabilities and their advocates will continue to be required to analogize their
situations to those of people with physical handicaps in order to
prevail on their claims of housing discrimination.
What type of accommodation is possible for people with mental
disabilities? In the context of housing, the only qualification for
admittance to housing should be the financial ability to pay rent. All
other requirements, such as keeping an apartment clean or not
having pets, should be subject to accommodation. Only those people
who are unable to pay rent, personally or with support, should be
considered not "otherwise qualified." Thus, a landlord may ask a
person with mental retardation or a person labeled mentally ill for
references regarding his or her ability to pay the rent, just as she or
he may do for all prospective tenants.1 1 2 The landlord may also
consider past rental history in his or her decision to accept or reject
applicants for housing. 8 ' A landlord, however, is not permitted to
infer that a recent hospitalization or history of institutionalization
constitutes proof that an applicant will be unable to fulfill the
obligations of the tenancy.18 4 Indeed, any reason for rejecting an
applicant with a mental disability other than an inability to pay rent
is impermissible unless the applicant poses a substantial threat to the
health and safety of others or to the physical integrity of the
require an applicant to
property.185 In short, the FHAA regulations
186
meet the "requirements of tenancy."
The FHAA regulations include a statement that reasonable
accommodation does not require a housing provider to make available
supportive services, such as counseling, medical, or social services, that
fall outside the scope of the services that the housing provider offers
to residents generally. 8 7 The nature of a handicap, however, may

181. 24 C.F.tR § 100.204(b) (1993); see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(3) (c) (i)-(iii) (1988).
182. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c) (1988) (stating that FHAA does not "prohibit[] a person
engaged in the business of furnishing appraisals of real property to take into consideration
factors other than race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or familial status"); 42
U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1988) (including in definition of "handicap" "physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities").
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605(c) (providing for consideration of other factors not prohibited by
FHAA in appraising prospective real estate transactions).
184. SeeH.1R REP. No. 711, supranote 95, at 29-30, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190-91 (stating that
fact of history of mental illness alone is insufficient for landlord to refuse to rent to prospective
tenant).
185. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 30, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2191 (restricting
questions landlord may ask to applicant's ability to meet tenancy requirements); see also24 C.F.R.
§ 100.202(c) (1993) (discussing permissible inquiries by landlords).
186. 24 C.FR. § 100.202(c)(1).
187. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a).
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require assistance of some kind. Applying standard rental leases to all
residents without taking into consideration their individual needs may
result in a refusal to accept almost all applicants with mental
disabilities. In promulgating the regulations, HUD stated that
although a landlord does not have to provide fundamentally different
housing to disabled applicants, " [ t] he test is whether with appropriate
modifications, the applicant can live in the housing that the housing
provider offers; not whether the applicant could benefit from some
other type of housing that the housing provider does not offer."" 8
The apparent purpose of this provision is to allay landlords' fears that
the regulations will obligate them to provide additional services to
tenants with disabilities that they do not already offer to tenants
without disabilities. Neither section 504 nor the FHAA regulations,
the conduct prohibited by these
however, effectively describe
189
antidiscrimination laws.
Several tenants with mental disabilities have successfully challenged
lease provisions that failed to accommodate their needs. In Majors v.
Housing Authority, 9 ' for example, a tenant challenged the "no pet"
provision of her lease on the ground that reasonable accommodation
under section 504 required the landlord to permit her to keep her
dog because of her mental disability that required her to rely on the
dog's companionship.1 91 The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed." 2 The
appellate court held that except for her "psychological and emotional" dependency on her pet poodle, the plaintiff was "otherwise
qualified" and that an exception to the no pet rule would be a
"reasonable accommodation" as required by section 504.19s Thus,
like Southeastern Community College v. Davis,9 4 in which the Supreme
Court held that defendants were not required to act affirmatively to
accommodate a plaintiff's handicap,'9 5 the court in Majors did not
require the landlord to act. Rather, the landlord was required not to

188. 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3249 (1989) (discussing reasonable accommodation requirement of
24 C.FR. § 100.204).
189. See 24 C.F.R. § 8.11 (1993); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204.
190. 652 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1981).
191. Majors v. Housing Auth., 652 F.2d 454, 455 (5th Cir. 1981).
192. Id. at 454.
193. Id. at 458.
194. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
195. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,413-14 (1979) (holding that
§ 504 did not require nursing school to adapt its teaching program to accommodate deaf
student).
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act; he was required not to enforce the no pet rule in the lease. 9 6
Accordingly, accommodating the plaintiff required no undue
197
burden.
A Massachusetts case provides another example in which the
reasonable accommodation requirement was interpreted to compel
modification of the plaintiffs lease. In Whittier Terrace Associates v.
Hampshire,1' s the state appellate court overturned the eviction of a
tenant with a psychiatric disability that made her emotionally
dependent on her cat.1 99 The tenant was, in the court's view, an
"ideal tenant" and, therefore, the landlord should permit her to keep
her cat
to enable her "to continue to function successfully on her
2 00
own. 9

A second category of reasonable accommodation cases involves
challenges to evictions by people with disabilities whose conduct is at
20e
212
a housing court
issue. °1 In Peabody Properties, Inc. v. Jeffries,
judge prevented the eviction of a deaf tenant labeled mentally ill who
had allegedly taunted and harassed other tenants and the building's
security guards by making gestures and noises, kicking over trash cans,
kicking the walls in common areas, and opening windows in cold
weather. °3 The court concluded that although the tenant had
engaged in disorderly and inappropriate behavior, she could not be
evicted because the landlord had not attempted to accommodate her
handicap.20 4 The court observed that although the tenant's behavior mightjustify the eviction of a non-disabled tenant, in this case, her
disability excused her.2 5 The court reasoned that "serious disabili196. Majors, 652 F.2d at 458 (stating that exception to enforcement of no pet rule was
.reasonable" accommodation and remanding for determination of material facts); see alsoEvans
v. Watson, No. 91-904-FR, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1420, at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 4, 1993) (stating that
exception to no pet rule was "reasonable accommodation" for tenant with epilepsy).
197. Majors, 652 F.2d at 457-58.
198. 532 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
199. Whittier Terrace Assocs. v. Hampshire, 532 N.E.2d 712, 713 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
200. Id.; see also Schuett Inv. Co. v. Anderson, 386 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that landlord did not reasonably accommodate tenant who had injured her back when
landlord insisted that tenant clean her apartment and remedy fire code violations and ordering
landlord to grant grace period to allow tenant's recovery before requiring cleaning).
201. See, e.g., Larry Realty Co. v. Matthews, No. 89-CG-1211, at 2-3 (Circ. Ct. for Balt. County,
MD, Jan. 30, 1990) (settlement agreement) (on file with The American University Law Review)
(providing settlement agreement reached in eviction case between subsidized housing landlord
and married couple with developmental disabilities in which staff and tenants of housing project
agreed to participate in training to "increase the staffs understanding of and sensitivity to the
needs and special problems of tenants with disabilities").
202. Memorandum of Findings, Rulings, Order for Entry ofJudgment, and Injunctive Order,
Peabody Properties, Inc. v. Jeffries, No. 88-SP-7613-S (Mass. Trial Ct., Hampden Div., Jan. 6,
1989).
203. Id. at 2, 8-9.
204. Id. at 7-9.
205. Id. at 7.
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ties were involved in this case" and that "[t]hey cannot be ignored by
the court, and anyone inclined to ignore them would do well to
remember that tomorrow's accident or disease could leave any of us
20 6
immobile, in darkness, or in the silent world of Dorothy Jeffries."
Accordingly, the court held that Ms. Jeffries could not be evicted until
steps were taken to accommodate her handicap." 7 The court then
ordered the parties to enter into a stipulation outlining the specific
208
steps that the landlord would take to accommodate the tenant.
In another case by the same judge who decided Peabody Propertiesv.
Jefries, the housing court prevented a landlord from evicting a tenant
who suffered from schizophrenia and, during an episode resulting
2 9
from her illness, had damaged the walls of her apartment unit.
In City Wide Associates v. Penfield,21 ° the housing court concluded that
the tenant's disability caused her to engage in behavior that would
likely justify the eviction of a non-disabled tenant.21 1 The court,
however, found that the laws governing handicapped discrimination
required a result other than eviction. 212 The judge ordered the
landlord to accommodate the tenant's handicap by discontinuing the
eviction action. 213 The tenant in this case reported that she heard
voices coming from inside the walls of her apartment and that she
struck back at the voices by hitting the walls or by throwing objects at
them.214 The landlord argued that the tenant had caused substantial damage to the walls of her apartment requiring costly repair, and

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 9. The court also found that although certain of Ms. Jeffies' actions were
inappropriate and aggressive, they did not constitute a direct threat to others but rather were
the result of her disability. Id. at 7-8. For example, her aggressive gestures were not threats to
other tenants but an attempt to indicate that she was endangered by the smell of noxious fumes
in her apartment. Id. at 4-5. The court did not specify how to accommodate the tenant, but
it did offer several suggestions, such as requiring the landlord to investigate and correct, if
necessary, the offensive odor in Ms. Jeffiies' apartment and to provide training and interpreters
for the security guards and other building personnel to assist them in communicating with Ms.
Jeffries. Id. at 8 n.3.
The parties' subsequent stipulation heeded the court's suggestions. Stipulated Order,
Peabody Properties, Inc. v.Jeffries, No. 88-SP-7613-S (Mass. Trial Ct., Hampden Div., Feb. 13,
1989). The landlord agreed to investigate the presence of any noxious fumes in the tenant's
apartment, to train security guards to increase their understanding of and sensitivity to the needs
and special problems of the tenant, to provide interpreter services, and to install and maintain
visible indicators to alert the tenant of the arrival of guests as well as the event of a fire. Id. at
1-2.
209. CityWide Assocs. v. Penfield, 564 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Mass. 1991) (reviewing disposition
of case at housing court level).
210. 564 N.E.2d 1003 (Mass. 1991).
211. Penfld 564 N.E.2d at 1004-05.
212. Id. at 1005.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1004.
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that she had violated the clause in her lease in which she agreed not
to "deface or otherwise damage the dwelling unit."215 On appeal,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that reasonable
accommodation was required under section 504 and that the housing
court was correct in proposing as reasonable accommodation that the
landlord provide the tenant with an opportunity to pursue counseling.21' Applying the balancing test of the anticipated benefit to the
tenant of continued subsidized housing against the burden on the
owner, the appellate court prevented the tenant's eviction. 217 In the
court's view, the cost of repair was small in relation to the rent over
Ms. Penfield the
the course of the tenancy and the benefit of allowing
21
opportunity to continue to live independently.
Thus, the requirement of reasonable accommodation requires a
fact-based, individualized assessment and plan, not adherence to an
inflexible legal rule. While the requirement provides certain
protections to people with mental disabilities, it does not guarantee
equality nor require any affirmative action. Rather, it attempts to
ensure that people with disabilities are provided equal opportunities
based on their abilities. On the other hand, affirmative action would
require some effort beyond nondiscrimination and reasonable
accommodation to increase the participation of people with disabilities in society. Affirmative action for people with disabilities would
focus on removing the present effects of past discrimination, rather
than on merely eliminating only current discrimination.2 1 9 Affirmative action attempts to provide remedial relief to the class of persons
subject to discrimination.2 20 To date, no statute provides such
affirmative action for people with disabilities.

215. Id.
216. Id. at 1005.
217. Id. at 1004-05 (holding that reasonable accommodation was required in light of
superficial nature of damage and absence of impact on other tenants).
218. Id.; see also Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that
reasonable accommodation includes provision of services to handicapped individual). But see
Housing Auth. v. Pappion, 540 So. 2d 567, 569-70 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that tenant
considered paranoid schizophrenic was not "otherwise qualified" under § 504 for tenancy where
tenant had threatened other residents and exhibited bizarre behavior).
219. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 363 (1977) (allowing state
educational institutions to adopt admissions program that explicitly took race into account to
improve position of class members who were disadvantaged by past discrimination).
220. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444-79 (1986) (holding that title VII
does not prohibit race-conscious relief as remedy for past discrimination); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 757-62 (1976) (providing retroactive seniority status to minority
employees on showing of discriminatory promotion practices).
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4.

Reasonable modification
In addition to the reasonable accommodation requirement, the
FHAA provides that a person with a disability has a right to make
reasonable modifications in or on the premises after securing the

owner's approval. 221 No similar provision appears in section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. "Reasonable modification" differs from
"reasonable accommodation" in that it is accomplished by the

prospective homeowner or tenant rather than by the current owner.
Under the reasonable modifications provision, the prospective owner
or tenant may make changes at her or his own expense that the
existing owner or landlord is not required to make. 222 If the tenant

believes the landlord is unreasonably withholding consent, the tenant
may file a complaint with HUD. 22 3 No case has yet addressed the
question of whether a landlord may shift the cost of an accommoda-

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3) (A) (1988). The regulations provide:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to refuse to permit, at the expense of a
handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing premises, occupied or to be
occupied by a handicapped person, if the proposed modifications may be necessary to
afford the handicapped person full enjoyment of the premises of a dwelling. In the
case of a rental, the landlord may, where it is reasonable to do so, condition
permission for a modification on the renter agreeing to restore the interiors of the
premises to the condition that existed before the modification, reasonable wear and
tear excepted. The landlord may not increase for handicapped person any customarily
required security deposit. However, where it is necessary in order to ensure with
reasonable certainty that funds will be available to pay for the restorations at the end
of the tenancy, the landlord may negotiate as part of such a restoration agreement a
provision requiring that the tenant pay into an interest bearing escrow account, over
a reasonable period, a reasonable amount of money not to exceed the cost of the
restorations. The interest in any such account shall accrue to the benefit of the tenant.
(b) A landlord may condition permission for a modification on the renter providing
a reasonable description of the proposed modifications as well as reasonable assurances
that the work will be done in a workmanlike manner and that any required building
permits will be obtained.
24 C.F.R. § 100.203(a)-(b) (1993).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3) (A) (1988). The regulations provide examples to clarify the
"reasonable modifications" provision. 24 C.F.R. § 100.203(c) (1993). One example involves
parents of a wheelchair-bound child who wish to widen the bathroom doorway of an apartment
at their own expense. Id. It would be unlawful under the statute and the regulations for the
landlord to refuse to permit the parents to make the modifications. Id. It also would be
unlawful for the landlord to require the parents to pay for narrowing the doorway at the end
of their tenancy because "a wider doorway will not interfere with the landlord's or the next
tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises." Id.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1988). Although a landlord may not prevent a tenant from making
reasonable modifications, a landlord may require a tenant to make a deposit to be used to
restore the premises to their original condition at the end of the tenancy. 24 C.F.R. §
100.203(a) (1993). The landlord, however, may not routinely require all people with disabilities
to make deposits. Fair Housing Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 3231, 3248 (1989). In each case, the
landlord must make an individual determination of the risk that the premises will not be
restored, taking into account the duration of the lease, the tenant's credit and tenancy history,
and the extent of the modifications. Id. at 3248.
221.
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tion to the tenant, claiming it is a modification rather than an
accommodation.
B. DiscriminatoryActions Prohibited by the FHAA
The Fair Housing Amendments Act prohibits discrimination against
people with disabilities in all transactions related to housing.
Specifically, the FHAA makes it unlawful to discriminate "in the sale
or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
buyer or renter because of a handicap." 224 With one notable
exception, the actions prohibited by the FHAA are similar to those
prohibited by the original version of the law.2 ' The FHAA prohibits not only the actual denial of housing but also decisions that
operate to deny people with disabilities equal access to housing,
including the application of government-imposed restrictions on the
ability to provide housing for people with mental disabilities.2 26 As
the House Report makes clear:
Another method of making housing unavailable to people with
disabilities has been the application or enforcement of otherwise
neutral rules and regulations on health, safety and land-use in a
manner which discriminates against people with disabilities. Such
discrimination often results from false or overprotective assumptions about the needs of handicapped people, as well as unfounded
may
fears of difficulties about the problems that their tenancies
27
pose. These and similar practices would be prohibited.
Thus, while not every decision that has a disproportionately adverse
effect on people with mental disabilities violates the FHAA, zoning
laws and other land-use decisions that exclude people with mental
disabilities are illegal under the FHAA 228 Such prohibited acts
include the application of special-use permit requirements, limitations

224. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (1) (1988).
225. While both statutes make it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
or national origin, the FHAA also adds sex, handicap, and familial status as protected categories.
Compare Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 804-806, 82 Stat. 82, 82-84 with Fair
Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988) (prohibiting discriminatory acts
related to real estate transactions specifying actions that discriminate and are proscribed).
226. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
227. H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.N. at 2185. From the language
of the House Report, it appears that the zoning ordinance at issue in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,448-49 (1985), would be illegal under the FHAA because the
Supreme Court found that the ordinance at issue in Cleburne was based on reasons that were
either impermissible (e.g., neighbors' fears for safety) or unbelievable (e.g., concern for
residents' safety). See infra notes 275-86 and accompanying text (discussing Court's reasoning
in Cleburne).
228. See H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
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on the number of residents in a home, 229 and dispersal and density
limits. 21 Similarly, private restrictions such as restrictive covenants
are no longer enforceable if they restrict the ability of people with
disabilities to live where they wish. 31 For example, a zoning ordinance that required a special-use permit only for homes for people
with mental retardation would be illegal because it would impose a
requirement on people with disabilities and not on non-disabled
people.3 2
Although HUD's regulations do not expressly address zoning laws,
the legislative history of the FHAA makes clear that local laws are valid
only if they are applied equally to all residents and do not discriminate on the basis of handicap. 23
Further, because the FHAA
prohibits discriminatory effects, not just intentional discrimination,
regulations that appear neutral are unlawful if they have the effect of
restricting housing opportunities for people with disabilities.2 4 The
scope of the statute's coverage is made clear by the House Committee
Report:
The Committee intends that the prohibition against discrimination
against those with handicaps apply to zoning decisions and

practices. The Act is intended to prohibit the application of special
requirements through land-use regulations, restrictive covenants
and conditional or special use permits that have the effect of
limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence of
their choice in the community. Under [this law], land use and

zoning cases are to be litigated in court by the Department of
Justice. They would not go through the administrative process.us

229. SeeVillage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1973) (holding that local ordinance
limiting number of unrelated residents living together to two was valid exercise of legislative
power); see also Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1341-46 (D.NJ.
1991) (granting injunction to prevent city from enforcing restriction on number of residents in
group home for recovering alcoholics and drug abusers because city ordinance violated FHAA).
230. See United States v. Village of Marshall, 787 F. Supp. 872, 876-78 (W.D. Wis. 1991)
(addressing challenge to ordinance requiring 2500 feet between community living facilities).
231. See H.R REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.N. at 2185 (stating that
FHAA is "intended to prohibit the application of special requirements through land-use
regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or special-use permits that have the effect of
limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in the community").
232. See H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2173 (stating that
FHAA prohibits discriminatory use of land-use and health-and-safety restrictions, which
"sometimes been used to restrict the ability of individuals with handicaps to live in communities").
233. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.CAN. at 2185.
234. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185 (discussing
discriminatory enforcement of neutral health, safety, and land use laws and regulations and
stating that such discrimination is unlawful).
235. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.N. at 2185.
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When the Department of Justice determines that a violation of the
rights of people with disabilities may have occurred, the Attorney
General may sue to challenge local zoning practices. 23 6 To date, the
Department has filed several complaints alleging violations of the
FHAA in the enactment and application of restrictive zoning laws.237
While the power to zone can be a beneficial regulatory tool, states
and localities may exercise that power only pursuant to a permissible
governmental purpose. 231 Often, zoning laws affecting the development or use of residences for people with mental disabilities have not
withstood this test. Although zoning laws are designed to regulate
only how land is used, local zoning authorities have seized upon local
zoning laws as a way to regulate who uses the land, thereby excluding
29
from residential communities people considered "different."

236. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 95, at 24, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2185 (stating that land use and zoning cases will not go through administrative process).
237. See, e.g., United States v.City of Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 442, 447-50 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(holding that city zoning ordinance prohibiting expansion of adult foster care home from six
to 12 residents violated FHAA by placing demand on persons with disabilities that was not placed
on other unrelated persons); United States v. Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 359-62
(D.NJ. 1991) (holding that enforcement of zoning ordinance in effort to force closure of home
for recovering alcoholics and drug users violated FHAA); United States v. Village of Marshall,
787 F. Supp. 872, 879 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (stating that failure to grant exception to statute
requiring 2500 feet between community-based residential facilities violated "reasonable
accommodation" provision of FHAA); United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220, 223-25
(D.P.R. 1991) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of zoning agency order
requiring closure of nursing home for elderly handicapped persons); Consent Decree at 2-4,
United States v. City of Chicago Heights, No. 89-C-4981 (N.D. Ill.,Jan. 16, 1990) (enjoining city
from discriminating against buyers or renters with disabilities and granting special-use permit
to group home for adults with developmental disabilities); United States v. Schuylkill Township,
No. 90-2165, 1990 WL 180980, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1990) (holding that amended zoning
ordinance discriminated against people with disabilities in violation of FHAA); Consent Decree
at 2, Zimmer v. Moon Township, No. 89-1139 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1989) (reciting consent decree
under which township agreed to repeal ordinance requiring spacing of one mile between
community-based residential facilities); cf.Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F.
Supp. 1329, 1341-46 (D.NJ. 1991) (deciding that group home for recovering substance abusers
was entitled to preliminary injunction modifying restraints on number of residents allowed based
on likelihood that state court would find restraints to be in violation of FHAA).
238. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.2, at 513 (2d ed. 1993)
(discussing government's ability to restrict land use as exercise of"police power"); see also Euclid
v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 368-94 (1926) (stating that zoning ordinances that are not
unreasonable or arbitrary uses of police power are constitutional).
239. See, e.g., Town of Huntington v. NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988) (holding that zoning
ordinance restricting location of low-income housing has discriminatorily disparate impact on
minorities); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 (7th Cir.
1977) (holding that denial of permit for construction of low-cost housing has greater effect on
African-Americans than on whites and, therefore, violates Fair Housing Act), cert. denied,434 U.S.
1025 (1978); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir.) (stating that policy of selling
lots only to builders discriminates on basis of race), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); City of
Taylor, 798 F. Supp. at 447-50 (holding that zoning ordinance that restricts size of adult fostercare home discriminates against disabled persons); Borough of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. at 359-62
(holding that zoning ordinance prohibiting establishment of group home for substance abusers
is discriminatory).
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Today, federal and state laws reflect the public policy of providing
people with disabilities with community care as an alternative to
institutionalization.' 4 With the advent of deinstitutionalization, new
concepts emerged regarding the type of housing best suited for
people leaving state mental hospitals and mental retardation
facilities. 41 For those who were able to live without constant
medical services, group living arrangements or home care provided
by family or friends was the desirable alternative to institutional
living.242 Group homes and other community residences housing
people with the same disability have been viewed the best way to
2
further the principle of normalization. 3
This concept of group living has been considered consistent with
the goal of normalization, which entails providing people with mental
disabilities with "the patterns of life and conditions of everyday living
which are as close as possible to the regular circumstances and ways
of life of society."244 Further, as the principle of normalization was
interpreted in the early years of deinstitutionalization, people with
mental disabilities were to be provided with the opportunity to live
together as a household under the supervision of surrogate parents
and in a residential neighborhood. 4 5
Together with educational and employment opportunities,
community living would provide the individual with a disability with
an opportunity to reach his or her potential and become a productive

240. Congress has enacted several laws that recognize the need for individual program
planning, including the provision of services on a nondiscriminatory basis and in noninstitutional settings. See, e.g., Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §
3026 (1988) (outlining plan for encouraging and assisting state agencies to serve elderly);
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6081-6082 (1988)
(encouraging and funding states to set up community programs for disabled); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1413 (1988) (finding state special
education services for handicapped children); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 722 (1988)
(providing for written, structured rehabilitation programs for handicapped).
241. SeeJuDITH B. KRAUSS & ANN T. SIAVINSKY, THE CHRONICALLY ILL PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT
AND THE COMMUNITY 95-129 (1982) (discussing strategy for care of mentally ill within
community).
242.

See COMMUNITY LIVING FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES

24 (John W.Jacobson et al. eds., 1992) (noting that studies indicate that community treatment
is almost always as, or more, effective than hospital-based treatment).
243. See id. at 219 (discussing studies that measure effects of moving disabled into homelife
settings); BRUCE L. BAKER ET AL., As CLOSE As POSSIBLE: COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR RETARDED

ADULTS 39 (1977) (finding that small group homes effectively promote most principles
important to normalization).
But see STEVEN J. TAYLOR ET AL., THE NONRESTRICTIVE
ENVIRONMENT: ON COMMUNITY INTEGRATION FOR PEOPLE WITH THE MOST SEVERE DISABILITIES
50 (1987) (suggesting that group homes should not put people with similar disabilities together
and should be limited to four residents).
244. Bengt Nije, The NormdzatianPinciple in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES
FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 231, 231 (1976).

245.

Id. at 232, 236.
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member of society.246 In fact, studies have proven the efficacy of
providing services in the community and have shown that community
care reduces hospitalizations.24 7 By most accounts, both treatment
and quality of life were as good or better for persons receiving
community care as for those receiving treatment in mental hospitals.248

Yet, when community care homes attempted to open in

residential areas, neighbors feared that these homes would depress
property values and destroy the residential character of their
neighborhoods.24 9 Accordingly, with the assistance of local authorities, zoning laws were used to prevent people with mental disabilities
from having such housing opportunities."
Thus, despite the
recognized public policies of deinstitutionalization and normalization,
the development of community housing opportunities was and
continues to be slow and has not kept pace with the demand for such
housing.
Neighborhood opposition to housing for people with mental
disabilities has been intense at times, and zoning laws have fueled the
opposition's fire.251 Zoning laws generally divide communities into
three districts: residential, commercial, and mixed use.252 Typically,
a zoning ordinance sets forth land uses that are permissible, those
that are not, and those for which special permission from a zoning

246. Id. at 237.
247.

See BENJAMIN PASAMANICK ET AL, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE COMMUNITY 99-102 (1967);

Fred R. Fenton et al., A ComparativeTrial ofHome and HospitalPsychiatricCare, 36 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1073, 1077 (1979); Leonard I. Stein & Mary A. Test, Alternatives to Mental Hospital
Treatment; 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 392, 392 (1980).
248. See Charles A. Keisler, Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care: Noninstitutionalizationas
PotentialPublicPolicy for Mental Patients,37 AM. PSYCHOL 349, 349 (1982); Stein & Test, supra
note 247, at 394-97.
Community care should not be confused with nursing home care. Nursing homes are
institutions, not homes.
Indeed, deinstitutionalization may better be described as
transinstitutionalizaton because many people were simply transferred from one institution (such
as a state mental hospital) to another (such as a nursing home). SeeJOHNSON, supra note 6, at
125-26 (stating that in years of deinstitutionalization, nursing home industry flourished). For
example, in just five years, New York state nursing homes received a 450% return on their
original investments. Id.
249. See Group Homes GainingGround: Despite Opposition, Number of ProposalsExpected to Rise,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 19, 1993, at 37 (explaining that fear of declining property values caused original
opposition to group homes); Viewpoints, NEWSDAY, Oct. 4, 1993, at 40 (stating that neighbors'
claim is that group home will bring drug addicts into neighborhood).
250. See Steven A. Adler, Group Homes and Deinstitutionalization: The Legislative Response to
Exclusionary Zoning, 6 VT. L. REV. 509, 509 n.5 (1981) (discussing exclusionary zoning that
operates to bar group homes from communities).
251. See 'Family Values' in Wilmette CHI. TRIB., Sept. 14, 1988, at C20 (decrying residents'
opposition to change in zoning laws that would allow small group homes);James Feron, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 2, 1978, at 3 (discussing opposition to group homes by residents of county with 17
homes for mentally disabled).
252. See ROGER BERNHARDT, REAL PROPERTY 370-74 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing creation of
zoning districts).
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authority is required." s Some zoning boards, at the instigation of
influential neighbors, have attempted to use zoning laws to exclude
people with mental disabilities from residential communities.25 4
One common method of exclusion is to designate a group home as
a boarding home, medical facility, school, or business, thereby
restricting the home to operation in areas zoned for commercial and
industrial use."aS
Most courts have ruled in favor of group homes, concluding that a
community's fears about declining property values or the danger of
prospective residents of group homes are unfounded and not
legitimate bases for denying a group home the necessary permit to
open."5 6 Courts have also rejected claims by neighborhood associations or local governing authorities that they have a right to approve
a 7 Thus, although
the site of a group home prior to its opening."

253. See id. at 365-77 (reviewing types of land-use regulation).
254. See, e.g., Sylvia Adcock, Groupfor Mentally Ill Sues OysterBay, NEWSDAY, May 12, 1993, at
31 (noting that opposition of neighbors and town officials to group home for mentally disabled
preceded lawsuit over zoning interpretation); Brian Cox, Zoningfor Group Homes Called illegal,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1993, at N3 (stating that zoning ordinance, which restricted location of
group homes for mentally disabled and was passed because of neighbors' concerns, may be
illegal); Peter Geller, Painesville'sZoningDrops Group Homes, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 3, 1993,
at BI (discussing elimination of special category in zoning code for group homes for disabled
due to neighbors' fears).
255. See, e.g., Civitans Care, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 437 So. 2d 540, 543 (Ala. Civ. App.
1983) (deciding that group home for adults with developmental disabilities was boarding house
rather than family dwelling); Roundup Found., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 626 P.2d 1154, 1156
(Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that group home for children with mental retardation did not
fit zoning ordinance definition of family and did not constitute "single unit dwelling"); City of
Westerville v. Kuehnert, 553 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that foster family
home for people with disabilities was neither business nor institution but family home); Markley
v. Carlisle Zoning Hearing Bd., 527 A.2d 595,596-99 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (discussing citizens
groups' attempt to classify one apartment in group of eight used to house mentally disturbed
individuals as "office" in order to exclude home from district zoned for apartments); Allegheny
Valley Sch. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 517 A.2d 1385, 1389 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding that
house for adults with mental retardation was not rooming house but rather charitable institution
functioning permissibly as single household in residential district); Culp v. City of Seattle, 590
P.2d 1288, 1290 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (designating group home for 12 children with mental
retardation as institution rather than family home).
256. See, e.g., Costiey v. Caromin House, 313 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1981) (ruling that fears
of threat to safety or reduction of property value are not sufficient bases for injunction against
group home); Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community Mental Health Ctr., 383
A.2d 1194, 1209 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (rejecting claim that group home for former
mental patients should be disallowed because it presented threat to general safety as argument
founded on unsubstantiated fears); Horizon House Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper
Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (noting neighbors' objections to group
home as "classic case of 'NIMBY,' not in my backyard" and permitting home to open). Not
surprisingly, public zoning board hearings quickly become a public forum to air prejudice
against people with mental disabilities. Such prejudice can take the form of hateful remarks and
patronizing concerns about the potential residents' welfare.
257. See, e.g., Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872,878 (Colo. 1983)
(holding that neighboring property owners' rights were not violated by absence of notice and
hearing before opening of group home); Clark v. Manuel, 463 So. 2d 1276, 1286 (La. 1985)
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opponents of group homes may turn to the courts, state and federal
courts alike have been unwilling to legitimate their fears and
prejudices. The courts have held consistently that individual property
owners have no right to determine who qualifies to be their neighbor
or to exercise control over the use of property owned by others.
The second and more common method for excluding group homes
from residential areas is to argue that community living arrangements
for people with mental disabilities are not included within the
definition of "family" in a zoning ordinance that restricts residences
to "single family dwellings." 8 "Family" is commonly defined in
such ordinances as one person living alone or two or more persons
related by blood, marriage, or adoption, or a group not exceeding a
certain number of unrelated persons living as a single housekeeping
unit.25
Some courts have interpreted such zoning ordinances
literally, thereby excluding certain homes from residential areas.26

(ruling that state law forcing prospective group homes to receive prior approval of local
governing authority violated Equal Protection Clause).
258. See, e.g., Roundup Found., 626 P.2d at 1156 (stating that group home for mentally
disabled children did not fit zoning ordinance definition of "family" and was not "single unit
dwelling"); Zoning Bd. v. T.A.ILC., 510 So. 2d 751, 753-54 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
definition of "family" does not imply single living unit, but rather relation, and upholding
injunction against group home); Normal Life v.Jefferson Parish, 483 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (La. Ct.
App. 1986) (upholding injunction against community home for mentally retarded because
residents of home were not "family" under zoning ordinance); Verland C.L.. v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 556 A.2d 4, 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (declaring that group residence for mentally retarded
did not cater to residents related by blood, and therefore was not single-family residence as
contemplated by zoning law); Appeal of Lynch Community Homes, Inc., 554 A.2d 155, 157-58
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (denying group home's claim that it should not need special exemption
in order to fall under ordinance's "group home" exception, and excluding home from
ordinance's definition of "family"); Culp, 590 P.2d at 1290 (finding that zoning ordinance
definition of "family" was not meant to include group home for retarded children where staff
did not live in home).
259. SeeJefferson Parish,483 So. 2d at 1125 (quoting ordinance that required either relation
by blood or marriage or four or fewer unrelated residents in order to satisfy "family
requirement"); Appeal of Lynch Community Homes, 554 A.2d at 156 (restating ordinance's
definition of "family," which required relation or limit of four unrelated individuals living as
single housekeeping unit).
260. SeeVillage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974). In Vllage of Belle Terre, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a local ordinance that narrowly defined "family"
to include only persons related by blood or marriage. Id. The ordinance at issue defined
"family" as follows:
[O]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of
persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption or marriage shall be deemed to
constitute a family.
Id. at 2. The owners of the home and three of the tenants challenged the ordinance on the
grounds that it interfered with the right to travel, that the village residents had no right to
dictate social homogeneity, that it restricted the lessees' privacy, and that it was of no concern
to villagers whether the lessees were married or not. Id. at 7. The Court found each of these
arguments unpersuasive and upheld the constitutionality of the local government's attempt to
enforce the ordinance, concluding that the ordinance at issue was a legitimate land-use
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Yet, under ordinances that define "family" in terms of a housekeeping
unit, rather than by relation, courts have regarded groups of people
with mental disabilities living together as families."'
The Supreme Court originally defined the contours of permissible
zoning legislation with respect to the definition of "family" in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland.6 In Moore, the Court held that certain
restrictions resulting from the narrow definition of "family" were
invalid and struck down, on due process grounds, a city ordinance
that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single
family.3 The ordinance at issue in Moore contained an unusually

regulation. Id. at 7-9. As Justice Douglas wrote:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs.... The police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy places. It is ample
to lay out zones where family values, youth values and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clear air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Id. at 9.
261. See Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Gunn, 477 N.E.2d 289, 299 (Ind.Ct. App.
1985) (characterizing group home for developmentally disabled as stable and permanent
household similar to any other home); West Monroe v. Ouachita Ass'n for Retarded Children,
402 So. 2d 259, 265-66 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that group home for mentally retarded
adults was single-family dwelling where residents had common interest and goals and would be
supervised by couple residing in home); Township of Washington v. Central Bergen Community
Mental Health Ctr., 383 A.2d 1194, 1209 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 1978) (holding that group
home for former mental patients in which residents jointly shared household tasks was
sufficiently similar to traditional family to comply with ordinance); Allegheny Valley Sch. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 517 A.2d 1385, 1388-89 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (classifying group home
for mentally retarded adults as charitable institution lawfully functioning as single household
permitted within residential district); Beres v. Hope Homes, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (Ohio
CL App.) (holding that six mentally retarded women living together as housekeeping unit
constituted family), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1982); Philadelphia Ctr. for Developmental
Servs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 492 A.2d 1191, 1192-93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (holding that
three people with mental retardation living together with resident staff member was family
"doing their cooking on the premises" in compliance with ordinance); Collins v. City of El
Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756, 760-62 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that use of home by four men
with mental retardation and their supervising parents was "for residential purposes" and
therefore complied with ordinance).
Further, courts in some states have found that single-family land-use ordinances that require
residents to be related are illegal under their state constitutions. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara
v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1980) (holding that zoning ordinance that distinguished
between related and unrelated groups living in home violated guarantees in California state
constitution); Statev. Baker, 405 A.2d 368,369 (N.J. 1979) (striking down ordinance prohibiting
more than four unrelated individuals from sharing house as improper means of furthering
legitimate goal of preserving "family" character of neighborhood); McMinn v. Town of Oyster
Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 1243-44 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that narrow definition of "family" violated
due process clause of state constitution).
262. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
263. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977). The majority in Moore
noted that the Court had "long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 63940 (1974)). The Court held that when the government intrudes on choices concerning family
life, the Court must examine the importance of the stated governmental interests more carefully
and the extent to which the regulation advances those interests. Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367
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restrictive definition of family, which included only certain, but not
all, categories of individuals related by blood or marriage. 2' The
City of East Cleveland argued that the Court should uphold the
ordinance under its earlier decision of Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas265 in which the Court upheld an ordinance defining "family"
as persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage. 2' The Court
rejected this argument and struck down the ordinance after finding
that it was only tenuously related to a legitimate governmental
267
purpose.
A review of zoning cases since Moore v. City of East Cleveland reveals
a potpourri of decisions interpreting the definition of "family" in
zoning ordinances. Although most of those decisions uphold the
right for people with mental disabilities to live in group homes in
areas zoned for single-family use, 2' the fact that residents of a
group home are not related by blood, marriage, or adoption
continues to be the primary rationale offered to exclude people with
mental disabilities from residential neighborhoods. 269 Whether or

U.S. 497, 554 (1961)). Justice Brennan was joined byJustice Marshall in a concurring opinion
that stated that the zoning power is not a license for local communities to arbitrarily restrict
private areas of protected family life. Id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring). In a second
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens provided an alternative rationale for invalidating the
ordinance, unrelated to its effect on family life. Justice Stevens observed that the ordinance cut
"deeply into a fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of residential property,"
namely that an owner may decide who may reside on his property. Id. at 520 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
264. For example, under the ordinance in Moore a household consisting of a grandmother,
her son, and her two grandsons (who were first cousins) would be unlawful. Id. at 496-97.
265. 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see supra note 260 (discussing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas).
266. Moore; 431 U.S. at 498.
267. Id.at 498-500. Accordingly, the plaintiffs conviction under the ordinance for sheltering
an "illegal occupant," her own grandson, was invalidated. Id.
268. See, e.g., Linn Countyv. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95, 99-100 (Iowa 1981) (holding
that group foster home for up to six disabled children that was staffed by trained married couple
was single-family home rather than boarding house); State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 372 (NJ.
1979) (stating that zoning ordinance that prohibited more than four unrelated individuals from
sharing house was improper means of furthering legitimate goal); Township of Washington v.
Central Bergen Community Mental Health Ctr., 383 A.2d 1194, 1207-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1978) (declaring that use of mental health center as transitional facility for former mental
patients was permitted use under zoning ordinance); Philadelphia Ctr. for Developmental Servs.,
Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 492 A.2d 1191, 1192-93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (holding that
community living arrangements for mentally retarded citizens fell within definition of "family"
in zoning ordinance and did not require special exception to operate); Collins v. City of El
Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756, 759-60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that home for four unrelated
mentally retarded men and their "houseparents" constituted "family" within zoning ordinance
definition).
269. See, e.g., Roundup Found., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 626 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that group home for mentally disabled did not satisfy ordinance's
definition of"family" and was not single-unit dwelling); Zoning Bd. v. T.A.R.C., 510 So. 2d 751,
753 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding injunction against group home that violated ordinance
definition of "family" requiring relation between residents); Appeal of Lynch Community
Homes, Inc., 554 A.2d 155, 158 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (stating that group home does not fall
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not a group home for people with mental disabilities may be
permitted in a particular neighborhood has turned on the language
of the particular ordinance and the characteristics of the particular
home. In general, courts have limited the discretion of local zoning
authorities in land-use decisions affecting people with mental
disabilities."'
Most courts now permit group homes to be located in areas zoned
for use by single-family dwellings because they have determined that
group homes operate like any other homes in which a family
resides.2 7 1 Other courts have chosen to exempt group homes

within zoning ordinance definition of "family" and must obtain special exemption in order to
operate).
270. For a comprehensive discussion of cases involving challenges to local zoning laws, see
Kanter, supra note 23, at 516-17.
271. See, e.g., City of Peekskill v. Rehabilitation Support Servs., 806 F. Supp. 1147, 1154-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying city's request for injunction to prevent maintenance of transitional
housing for people with mental disabilities because housing unit closely resembled family unit);
United States v. Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 442, 449 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that adult foster home
for elderly people with disabilities was appropriate for single family zone despite operator's forprofit status); Devereux Found. v. O'Donnell, No. 89-6134, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11831, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1990) (holding invalid zoning restriction that singled out group homes for
discriminatory treatment); Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 563 P.2d 12, 13-14 (Colo. 1977)
(holding that group composed of married couple and up to six handicapped children
constituted "family" under ordinance); Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n of Chester, 326 A.2d 841, 845
(Conn. C.P. 1974) (classifying state-supervised group home for small number of retarded adults
with two supervisory "parents" as "single housekeeping unit"); City of College Park v. Flynn, 282
S.E.2d 69, 71 (Ga. 1981) (determining that operation of group personal-care home for 12
mentally disabled persons was lawful when "family" was given generic definition); Linn County
v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95, 99-100 (Iowa 1981) (holding that group foster home for up
to six disabled children, staffed by trained married couple, was single-family home rather than
boarding house); Hamner v. Best, 656 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) (stating that
group home for children with emotional disturbances operated as single-family dwelling);
Thomas v. Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 535 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding home for six or fewer retarded adults to be single-family dwelling); Vienna Bend
Subdiv. Homeowners Ass'n v. Manning, 459 So. 2d 1345, 1349-50 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that community home for five adults with mental retardation and two live-in house parents was
residential and did not violate restrictive covenant); Harbour v. Normal Life, 454 So. 2d 1208,
1210-11 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that for-profit group home was residence rather than
business); City of West Monroe v. OuachitaAss'n for Retarded Children, 402 So. 2d 259,264-66
(La. Ct. App. 1981) (ruling that home for supervised mentally retarded adults with common
goals, interests, and problems was single-family dwelling); Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313
N.W.2d 21, 25-26 (Minn. 1981) (holding that group home for six retarded adults and two
resident supervisors was single-family unit even though operated for profit); Township of
Washington v. Central Bergen Community Health Ctr., 383 A.2d 1194, 1207-09 (N.J. 1978)
(classifying mental health center used as transitional residence as sufficiently permanent to
satisfy requirement of family); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 529 A.2d 1028, 1032-34 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (ruling that group home for college students was single family unit or
functional equivalent within meaning of zoning ordinance), aft'd 539 A.2d 1223, 1224 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); City of White Plains v. Ferriaoli, 313 N.E.2d 756,758-59 (N.Y. 1974)
(holding that ordinance cannot restrict single-family dwellings by defining "family" to exclude
stable home environments that are functional but not biological families); Village of Freeport
v. Association for Help of Retarded Children, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221, 223 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (defining
"community residence" as stable and permanent household consonant with lifestyle of familyoriented neighborhood); Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Org., 383 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367
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operating under state approval from local zoning restrictions
altogether.272 Such courts have reasoned that the home itself is an

(1976) (determining that group home reasonably resembling biological unitary family in size
and appearance would not alter character of single-family residential zone); White v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 451 N.E.2d 756, 758-59 (Ohio 1983) (stating that use of family home to house
two mentally retarded adults was valid accessory use in residential district); Freedom Township
Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Portage County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, 476 N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (finding evidence that occupants of
group home would function as family unit in general sense in absence of specific definition of
"family" in relevant ordinance); Beres v. Hope Homes, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Ohio Ct.
App.) (allowing group home for mentally retarded persons in area zoned as single-family
residential because home was private and occupants would act as family), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
937 (1982);Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Okla. 1985) (holding that occupants of
group home constituted "family" even though association establishing home received remuneration); Appeal of Miller, 515 A.2d 904, 906-09 (Pa. 1984) (holding that boarding house that
functioned like family unit would be permissible despite local ordinance's requirement of
relationship by blood, marriage, or adoption, or maximum of two unrelated residents);JALC
Real Estate Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 522 A.2d 710, 712 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (ruling that
four mentally retarded individuals living together constituted family for purposes of ordinance);
Mongonyv. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661, 663-64 (R.I. 1981) (holding that residents of group house
who shared household chores were family); Collins v. City of El Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756, 760
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that retarded residents and their supervisors constituted "family"
for purposes of ordinance). But see Roundup Found., 626 P.2d at 1156-57 (rejecting claim that
home for mentally retarded children satisfied ordinance requiring familial relationship because
residents were not related by blood); City of Kenner v. Normal Life, 483 So. 2d 903, 906-08 (La.
1986) (upholding ordinance defining "single-family dwelling" as residence occupied by four or
fewer people and finding that group home for six violated ordinance); T.A.R.C., 510 So. 2d at
753 (defining "family" as "number of persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption," and
finding that group home for six unrelated adults was not family); Normal Life, Inc. v.Jefferson
Parish, 483 So. 2d 1123, 1125-26 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that group home for six residents
and two counselors was not family as defined by ordinance); Clark v. Lafayette Ass'n for
Retarded Citizens, 461 So. 2d 323, 324-25 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that group home for
retarded that would be used for activities such as teaching daily living skills violated building
restriction limiting dwellings to single-family use); Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning
Comm'n, 408 N.E.2d 191, 193-94 (Ohio 1980) (holding that foster family was not family unit
because residents were transient and home was substantially remodeled to accommodate
children); Verland C.LA. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 556 A.2d 4, 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)
(designating community living arrangement for three mentally handicapped people as group
residence rather than single-family dwelling); Appeal ofLynch Community Homes, 554 A.2d at 158
(upholding restrictive definition of "family," which excluded group home for three unrelated
retarded persons, upon finding that ordinance was closely related to governmental interests);
Appeal of Summers, 551 A.2d 1134, 1136-37 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (rejecting argument that
homes that temporarily accepted and housed retarded persons in "respite care" program
qualified as "families"); Wengert v. Zoning Bd., 414 A.2d 148, 149 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)
(affirming zoning board's decision that foster home of up to six children could not be permitted
in single-family zone).
272. See, e.g., City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 322 So. 2d
571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that when state agencies have been exempted from
local zoning requirements, parties contracting to provide services for such agencies are also
exempt from zoning requirements), afid, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976); Region 10 Client
Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 424 A.2d 207, 209 (N.H. 1980) (declaring that state
interest in placing developmentally impaired persons in different locations across state could not
be frustrated by local zoning ordinance); Berger v. State, 364 A.2d 993, 999-1000 (N.J. 1976)
(finding that state law proscribing discrimination against children in group-home setting
precluded enforcement of local zoning ordinance to contrary); Abbott House v. Tarrytown, 312
N.Y.S.2d 841, 842-43 (App. Div. 1970) (holding that zoning ordinance making group home
unlawful was invalid as impediment to policy of State Board of Social Welfare); Town of
Southern Pines v. Mohr, 226 S.E.2d 865, 867 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that mental health
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agent for the state and therefore enjoys the state's immunity from
local regulation. 3 Other courts have ruled that local ordinances
with disabilities violate state
limiting the location of homes for people
274
policies favoring deinstitutionalization.
In cases where a group home is not immune from local regulation,
a zoning ordinance may require the home's operator to obtain a
special-use permit. The Supreme Court addressed the permissibility
275
of this requirement in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc.
In Cleburne, the first Supreme Court case addressing the rights of

center received 90% of funding from state-administered "government function" and finding that
center was therefore permissible under town zoning ordinance). But see Macon Ass'n for
Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 314 S.E.2d 218,223 (Ga.)
(holding that in absence of clear intent by legislature, property held by non-profit corporations
performing governmental services is not immune from local zoning regulations), appealdismissed,
469 U.S. 802 (1984).
273. See, e.g., Campbell v. City Council of Lynn, 586 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (Mass. App. CL 1992)
(holding group home jointly operated by state was exempt from zoning requirements as
'educational" institution); City of Temple Terrace, 322 So. 2d at 571; Livonia v. Department of
Social Servs., 328 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. Ct. App.) (noting that state-licensed adult foster care
homes enjoyed exemption from local zoning laws), affid in par4 378 N.W.2d 402 (Mich. 1982);
Region 10 ClientManagement, 424 A.2d at 207; Berger,364 A.2d at 993; Abbott House 312 N.Y.S.2d
at 841; Town of Southern Pines, 226 S.E.2d at 865. But see Macon Ass'n For Retarded Citizens, 314
S.E.2d at 218.
274. See, e.g, City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Ctrs., 638 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Cal. 1982)
(noting that California law favors local mental treatment facilities and completely preempts local
zoning regulations); Brandon Township v. North-Oakland Residential Servs., Inc., 312 N.W.2d
238, 241 (Mich. CL App. 1981) (citing legislative policy that "persons in need of community
residential care shall not be excluded by zoning"); Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d
21, 27-28 (Minn. 1981) (noting that Minnesota legislation enacted to facilitate group home
overrides local interest in zoning control); Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644, 650-52 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that state policy of public concern for juveniles required broad definition of
"single family residence" that included group home for up to 10 neglected boys); Region 10 Client
Management; 424 A.2d at 209 (finding state law supporting establishment of regional care facility
for developmentally impaired persons could not be interfered with by local zoning restrictions);
Mental Health Ass'n v. City of Elizabeth, 434 A.2d 688, 690-91 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981)
(holding that local zoning law impermissibly interfered with state law providing for establishment of community residences for people with developmental disturbances); Gedney Ass'n v.
New York Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 446 N.Y.S.2d 876, 879 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (determining that
establishment of family-style environments for people with mental disabilities is acceptable
governmental purpose and that local regulatory control may therefore be overridden); Abbott
Hous4 312 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (holding that local zoning law thwarted NewYork policy favoring care
of neglected and abandoned children); Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I. 1981)
(noting that state law defined six or fewer people with mental retardation living together as
"family" and overrode contrary municipal ordinance).
In Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 424 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1980), the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that although a proposed group home for eight
adults with mental retardation was not a family for zoning proposes, the home nonetheless
would be permitted in an area zoned exclusively for single-family residences because of a newly
enacted statute that expressed the state policy ofdeinstitutionalizing people with developmental
disabilities and relocating them in communities throughout the state. Id. at 209. As the court
held, "The statutory purpose of placing developmentally impaired persons in various locations
throughout the State carries out a State policy that cannot be frustrated by local zoning
restrictions." Id.
275. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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people with mental disabilities to live in residential communities, the
Court reviewed the constitutionality of a city's denial of a special-use
permit for a proposed group home for thirteen adults with mental
276
retardation in a residential area zoned for multiple occupancy.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the group
home to open.2 " The Court, however, rejected the plaintiff's claim
that heightened judicial scrutiny was appropriate because the rights
of people with mental retardation were at stake.2" 8 The Court

276. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). The Cleburne
Living Center, a not-for-profit Texas corporation, sought to lease a house in Cleburne for the
purpose of operating the city's first group home for people with mental retardation. Id. The
proposed home would provide an opportunity for 13 men and women to receive training in
independent living skills by a staff who would be on duty 24 hours a day. Id. The residents of
the home would havejobs in the community and their stay would be voluntary. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1984), affd in part and vacated in part,
473 U.S. 432 (1985). The home would also be operated as a facility entitled to joint federal and
state Medicaid reimbursement. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435 n.2. Accordingly, the home would be
subject to extensive federal and state regulations governing its operation. Id. The home at issue
was located in an area zoned for apartments. Id. at 435 n.3. According to the zoning
ordinance, the following uses were permitted: apartment houses or multiple dwellings; boarding
and lodging houses; fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories; apartment hotels; hospitals,
sanitariums, nursing homes, or homes for convalescents or aged other than the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts; private clubs or fraternal orders; and philanthropic or
eleemosynary institutions other than penal institutions. Id. at 436 n.3. (citing § 8 of Cleburne
zoning ordinance).
The city zoning board had classified the home as a "hospital for the feeble-minded," and
informed the Cleburne Living Center that a special-use permit would be required under the
city's zoning ordinance. Id. at 436. The Cleburne living Center applied for a special-use
permit, which was denied. The Center then filed a law suit challenging the constitutionality of
the zoning ordinance on the grounds that it discriminated against people with mental
retardation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
437. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas upheld the ordinance,
notwithstanding the court's finding that the city council's decision to deny the special-use permit
"was motivated primarily by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons who are
mentally retarded." Id. The district court concluded that the Cleburne ordinance was rationally
related to the city's legitimate interest in the safety and fears of residents in the adjoining
neighborhood and the number of people to be housed in the home. Id.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the lower
court had failed to apply the proper level ofjudicial scrutiny. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 195-96. The
court reasoned that people with mental retardation are entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny,
given their history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreatment," an absence of political power,
and the immutability of their condition. Id. at 197. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the
city had failed to demonstrate that its ordinance was substantially related to a sufficiently
important governmental objective. Id. at 200-02.
277. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
278. Id. In resolving challenges brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court applies one of three standards of review. The most
stringent standard of review, known as "strict scrutiny," is applied in cases involving statutes that
classify by race or national origin or that impinge upon a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. Under this test, the Court will uphold a legislative classification only if it is
sufficiently narrow to serve compelling state interests. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1967) (applying "most rigid scrutiny" and finding no overriding legislative concern in
deciding miscegenation statute to be unconstitutional). The intermediate level of review, or
"heightened scrutiny," is applied to legislative classifications based on gender and illegitimacy.
Such classifications will be sustained where they are substantially related to important
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declined to apply to "the mentally retarded a more exacting standard
of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social
legislation."279 As the Court explained, "They are thus different,
immutably so, in relevant respects, and the State's interest in dealing
with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one."2" The task
of deciding how best to treat people with mental retardation,
according to the Court, is "very much a task for legislators guided by
qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions
281
of the judiciary."
Although the Court refused to apply a heightened level of scrutiny,
it nonetheless invalidated the zoning ordinance by using the rational
basis test.2 12 The city had argued that it denied the permit to
protect the home's residents, not because of discriminatory motives. 3 Yet, the Court observed that the city did not seek to protect
other groups from the same risks.284 According to the majority, the
city's ostensible justifications for denying the special-use permit were
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose; the city's
purposes were, therefore, both impermissible and unworthy of
belief. 285 The Court found that "mere negative attitudes or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning

governmental interests. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24
(1982) (noting that gender-based discrimination is constitutionally permissible onlywhen based
on "important governmental objectives" achieved by means that are "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives"). The lowest level of review, the "rational basis test," applies
to most economic and social legislation. Under this test, the Court will sustain the statute if the
classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (describing application of rational basis test to areas not
impinging on fundamental rights).
In Ceburne the Fifth Circuit had held that mentally retarded people constitute a quasi-suspect
class entitled to heightened judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause because of the
segregation, political powerlessness, and prejudice to which they have been subjected. Cleburne,
726 F.2d at 197. The Supreme Court disagreed. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
279. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
280. Id. For a discussion of the Court's struggle with the meaning of the word "different"
in Cleburne,see MINOW, spra note 24, at 102-07.
281. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443. To illustrate the complexity of the issue of whether people
with mental retardation should be recognized as a quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened
judicial review, the Court noted the existence of federal and state laws that prohibited discrimination against mentally retarded people and guaranteed their right to receive treatment,
services, and habilitation in a setting that was "least restrictive of their personal liberty." Id.
(citing Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6009 (2) (1988)).
Apparently, the mere existence of such laws "negates any claim that the mentally retarded are
politically powerless." Id. at 445.
282. Id. at 450.
283. Id. at 449-50. The city expressed concern that the home was located on a 500-year flood
plain and that, should a flood occur, the residents would be endangered. Id. at 449. The city
also expressed concern that the home was too small for the number of proposed residents. Id.
284. Id. at 449-50.
285. Id. at 448-50.
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proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently from apartment homes, multiple
dwellings and the like."286 Both before and after the Supreme
Court decision in Cleburne, several lower courts have upheld the right
to operate homes for people with disabilities, on constitutional
grounds, in the face of restrictive local laws.287
In addition to zoning cases, such as Cleburne, that pit group home
operators against local zoning authorities, other cases have involved
individuals who own property near the site of a prospective group
home.288 Such lawsuits by neighbors of prospective group homes
often involve restrictive covenants running with the land. In the vast
majority of such cases, courts have allowed the group homes to open

286. Id. at 448.
287. See Burstyn v. City of Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 537 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (declaring
unconstitutional several provisions of ordinance regulating "adult congregate living facilities").
In Burstyn, the operators of such a facility were denied a special-use permit because the proposed
homes exceeded four stories and were located on streets excluded under the ordinance. Id. at
530-31. The City of Miami Beach had claimed that it was regulating housing for senior citizens
in this manner not because of any animus against elderly people, but because it wanted to
promote commercial development in an area now occupied by elderly citizens. Id. at 531. The
court held that the city's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional under Cleburne because it
treated residences for disabled people differently from those for other groups for no rational
reason. Id. at 537.
Similarly, in Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849
(1987), the city tried to close down an alcoholism treatment center by refusing to issue the
required conditional-use permits. Id. at 172-73. The city argued that it made the decision on
the basis of community opposition to the center. Id. at 173-74. The federal court of appeals
upheld the district court's preliminary injunction against the city on constitutional and statutory
grounds. Id. at 181-85. The appellate court's decision was based on the lower court's finding
that the opposition was motivated by prejudice against handicapped people and that the city
"took its essentially unjustified action in an atmosphere charged with hostility toward a minority
group." Id. at 185; see also Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 958 F.2d 1354, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992)
(declaring zoning ordinance requiring special-use permits as unconstitutional as applied to
group home for prisoners); Horizon House Developmental Servs. v. Township of Upper
Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding that town ordinance requiring
1000 foot spacing between group homes violated FHAA and U.S. Constitution).
InJ.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit held that people
with mental illness are entitled to a higher level of review and that the local zoning authority
prohibiting mentally ill individuals from living together in a group home failed such enhanced
scrutiny. Id. at 1131-32. In People v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983), a group of neighbors in a NewYork City suburb heard
that a group home was planned and bought the property on which it was to be located. Id. at
37. The state sued the property owners on the grounds that their action violated the civil rights
of the prospective residents as well as the New York human rights law. Id. The Second Circuit
held in favor of the state. Id. at 40-42.
288. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1559-61 (D. Kan. 1992) (upholding
motion for summary judgment against residents who interfered with neighbors' sale of their
home to operator of group home); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court, 752 F. Supp. 1152, 117172 (D.P.R. 1990) (relying on FHAA to enjoin enforcement of state court injunction ordering
owners of home for handicapped elderly people to close because of restrictive covenant),
vacated,988 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1993); Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 484,
486 (S.C. 1991) (holding that enforcement of restrictive covenant against group home for
mentally impaired adults would violate FHAA).
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despite a covenant limiting the use of property to single-family
homes. 289 Because nonprofit corporations would operate the homes
and the residents would function like any other household, most
courts have held that such homes fall within the language of the
restrictive covenant.2'
The Department of Justice has sued both individual homeowners2 ' and management companies of large apartment complexes1 2 for violating the FHAA. Private parties also have filed FHAA
complaints against municipalities and other private parties.293 While

289. See, e.g., CasaMarie,752 F. Supp. at 1171-72 (enjoining state court from closing group
home allegedly violative of restrictive covenant); Craig v. Bossenbery, 351 N.W.2d 596, 601
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to enforce restrictive covenant to bar group home).
290. See Clark v. Manuel, 463 So. 2d 1276, 1279 (La. 1985) (noting that training given to
mentally retarded adults in group home was analogous to parents' role in raising children and
that group home thus served residential purpose required by restrictive covenant); Vienna Bend
Subdiv. Homeowners Ass'n v. Manning, 459 So. 2d 1345, 1349-51 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
that group home for mentally retarded adults qualified as "residential purpose" because training
and work activities were conducted elsewhere); Concord Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Special
Children's Found., 459 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting argument that group
home for mentally retarded was not single-family residence); Harbour v. Normal Life, 454 So.
2d 1208, 1210-11 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that activities conducted at home for
handicapped persons were not business and did not violate building restrictions); Maull v.
Community Living for the Handicapped, Inc., 813 S.W. 2d 90,92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that residents of group home would function as family, dependent upon each other to carry out
home's daily operation and routines); Knudston v. Trainor, 345 N.W.2d 4, 6-8 (Neb. 1984)
(rejecting argument that group home was commercial enterprise that violated restrictive
covenant); Gregoryv. State, 495 A.2d 997, 1002 (I. 1985) (holding that group home residents'
disabilities did not change nature of dwelling from residential to commercial); Collins v. City
of El Campo, 684 S.W.2d 756, 761-62 (Tex. CL App. 1984) (determining that group home did
not violate architectural or uses provisions of single-family dwelling restrictive covenant); see also
Craig,351 N.W.2d at 601 (concluding that home did not fit language of restrictive covenant, but
upholding right of home to open by declaring covenant void for violating public policy). But
cf Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 319 S.E.2d 728, 732 (Va. 1984) (finding that term "single family
dwelling" in restrictive covenant did not contemplate group home and that zoning ordinance
could not release home from restrictive covenant).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 788 F. Supp. 1555, 1562-63 (D. Kan. 1992) (ruling that
neighbors who sought court enforcement of restrictive covenant to prevent homeowners from
selling their houses to group-home operator violated FHAA).
292. See, e.g., United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914,923 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that manager of apartment complex violated FHAA by refusing to rent to provider of
rehabilitative services for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts); Complaint at 2-3, United
States v. Sigal/Zuckerman Management, Inc., No. 90-0059A (E.D. Va. Jan. 18, 1990) (alleging
that management company refused to make reasonable accommodation for persons with
disabilities, including recovering substance abusers); see also Complaint at 1-3, United States v.
Grady Management, Inc., No. 90-0060-A (E.D. Va., Jan. 18, 1990) (challenging management
company's refusal to rent to Community Services Board for use as residential treatment center
for recovering drug and alcohol abusers); Complaint at 6, United States v. Park Forest, Ltd., No.
89-0630 (S.D. Iowa, Sept. 5, 1989) (involving suit to prevent eviction of tenant with physical
handicap).
293. See, e.g., Evans v. Watson, No. 91-904, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10808, at *4-*5 (D. Or.July
16, 1992) (compelling landlord to facilitate disabled tenant's inspection of other tenants' units
to determine whether landlord was violating FHAA); People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond,
789 F. Supp. 725, 734 (E.D. Va. 1992) (denying city's motion for summary judgment in action
alleging violation of FHAA by use of police power to interfere with housing of persons with
disabilities); Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-09 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)
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complaints by private parties alleging discriminatory practices
generally have succeeded, some recent decisions have questioned
how far the FHAA may reach into the zoning province of local
governments.2 95
C. State Zoning PreemptionStatutes
Today every state has either enabling legislation or state constitu6
tional provisions granting to its municipalities the power to zone.2
These provisions normally impose few substantive guidelines. As local
zoning laws began to be used to exclude group homes for people with
mental disabilities from residential communities, however, state
legislatures reacted by passing laws that preempted local zoning
laws. 297 These state laws preempt local ordinances by prohibiting

(determining that inquiries into housing applicants' ability to live independently violated HUD
regulation and FHAA).
294. See, e.g., Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43,47-48 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that
city ordinance imposing special safety requirements on all group homes without individualizing
requirements to take into account factors particular to people with different types of disabilities
violated FHAA); Horizon Hous. Dev. Servs. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp.
683, 699-700 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Easter Seals Soc'y v. Township of N. Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228, 238
(D.N.J. 1992) (granting plaintiff's application for preliminary injunction requiring town to issue
requisite construction permit); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450,
465 (D.NJ. 1992) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting town from enforcing zoning
ordinance against plaintiff halfway house); Parish ofJefferson v. Allied Health Care Inc., No.
91-1199, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124, at *21-*23 (E.D. La.June 10, 1992) (holding that zoning
ordinance limiting number of unrelated persons who could reside in single-family residence
violated FHAA); Stewart B. McKinney Found. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp.
1197,1221-22 (D. Conn. 1992) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting town from requiring
special exception for use of two-family residence as home for HIV-infected persons); Association
of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 102-06
(D.P.R. 1990) (finding that agency denial of special-use permit for AIDS hospice violated
FHAA); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 734-35 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that denial
of special-use permit for residence for AIDS-infected persons violated FHAA).
295. See, e.g., Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 376
(1992); Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
In Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that municipal dispersal requirements for group homes did not violate the FHAA.
Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 93-94. The court determined that the dispersal requirements reflected
the congressional goal of deinstitutionalization and ensured that group homes were located in
the community and not in neighborhoods made up exclusively of other group homes. Id.
Similarly, in Elliot v. City of Athens, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a city ordinance that
prohibited more than four unrelated individuals from living together in a single residence.
Elliott; 960 F.2d at 982-83. The court in Elliot determined that the maximum occupancy
limitation exemption (§ 3607 of the FHAA) applied, but that the city's use of the ordinance to
prevent overcrowding was nondiscriminatory. Id.
296. ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 2.01-29 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1993) (discussing various ways states have conferred zoning power on municipalities, including
enabling acts, constitutional provisions, municipal charters, and home rule).
297. See Salsich, supra note 2, at 424 (noting that over half of states have enacted statutes
easing zoning restrictions for group homes).
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the application of restrictive zoning laws to group homes for people
298
with mental disabilities.
In 1977, when the first national survey of state zoning laws
was conducted, only five states-California, Colorado, Minnesota,
Montana, and NewJersey-had state statutes preempting local zoning
laws.'
Today most states have statutes that preempt local zoning
ordinances by restricting localities from using their zoning laws to
prevent people with mental disabilities from living in residential
neighborhoods."tu If this trend continues, virtually every state will
soon have legislation promoting the acceptance of group homes in
local communities.301
The state preemption statutes supersede actions by local authorities
by revoking or curtailing their power to exclude group homes from
single-family-residence areas. 0 2 Generally, these laws have had the
effect of opening up desirable neighborhoods to people with mental
disabilities.
The state zoning laws vary in their approach.0 3 Some clearly

298. See infra notes 300-11 and accompanying text.
299. MARION K. BATES, WISCONSIN PLANNING COUNCIL, STATE ZONING STATUTES 2 n.* (1977)
(on file with The American University Law Review).
300. See Saisich, supranote 2, at 424.
301. Thirteen states have no state zoning legislation: Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Washington, and Wyoming. Although these states do not have zoning preemption laws, they
may not need such laws to promote the establishment of community living for people with
mental disabilities. In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, for example, legislation may be
unnecessary because court decisions explicitly protect the right of people with mental disabilities
to locate in residential areas. See, e.g., Harbor Sch. v. Board of Appeals, 366 N.E.2d 764, 768-69
(Mass. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that community residences are educational in purpose and
therefore immune from local zoning laws); Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of
Hampstead, 424 A.2d 207, 209 (N.H. 1980) (finding that state policy favoring
deinstitutionalization overrides local zoning ordinances).
In Pennsylvania, legislative declarations accomplish the same purpose. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 955 (h) (1) (1991 & Supp. 1993) (outlawing discrimination against handicapped or disabled
in housing accommodations). State zoning laws in Maine and Oregon were repealed in 1989.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-A (West Supp. 1993) (repealed 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §
443.600 (1991) (reopened 1989) and Illinois continues to consider legislation. Kentucky has
considered zoning legislation during the 1988 and 1989 sessions; although committee hearings
were held, no legislation passed. In Alaska, Mississippi, Washington, Wyoming, and South
Dakota, no significant efforts to enact state zoning legislation have been undertaken within the
past decade.
302. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2963(16a) (Callaghan 1989) (declaring group home of six or
fewer patients permitted use in all residential zones); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(f)
(McKinney 1988) (deeming group home as family unit for purposes of local laws).
303. The state preemption laws also vary with regard to the disabilities they cover. Although
virtually every state law covers group homes for people with developmental disabilities, only a
portion cover people with mental illness. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3e (West 1989 &
Supp. 1993) (barring different zoning treatment for homes housing fewer than six mentally
retarded persons); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(1) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994)
(including mentally disabled in definition of community residential facility for disabled); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 168-21 (1992) (defining "handicapped person" for group home purposes as
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preempt local zoning laws; others allow a municipality to retain
control over the zoning process for such homes. For example, several
state statutes permit local authorities to enforce conditions not
specified in the state zoning law, but only those conditions related to
health and safety regulations necessary to protect residents of the
group home. 0 4 In other states, local authorities are permitted to
require that group homes conform to standards regarding safety or
even compatibility with surrounding land uses. 05 State statutes may
also provide that small state-licensed homes are to be considered a
residential use of property and permitted in all residential zones,
including those zoned for single-family use.30 6 Several state statutes
simply designate residents of group homes as families to avoid any
problems locating group homes in areas zoned for single-family use.
In Rhode Island, for example, small family-like settings may be
people with mental retardation or mental illness in any
established for
30 7
community.
Most state laws also require state licensing for group homes.30 8
The rationale for such requirements is that the residents of the homes
are entitled to assurances that certain safety and health standards are
met and maintained. Some states use broad definitions of health and
safety, which can include concerns regarding the location of particular
homes and require that group homes be dispersed throughout the
residential sections of a municipality or that a license for a group
home be withheld if the proposed home would result in an
overconcentration of group homes in one area.3 ° In fact, most
including mentally retarded).
304. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-582.6 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWs § 125.216a(2)
(1992); MINN. STAT. § 245.812(4) (1982 & Supp. 1993); see also City of Livonia v. Department
of Social Servs., 378 N.W.2d 402, 418 (Mich. 1985) (upholding state statute prohibiting
municipalities from applying local construction and fire codes that effectively excluded group
homes from residential neighborhoods); Northwest Residence, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 352
N.W.2d 764, 773-74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (permitting municipalities to impose health and
safety standards appropriate to particular group home site).
305. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-115(2) (c) (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:478 (West
1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 13.40 (7)-(8) (1983 & Supp. 1993).
306. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 309(a) (1987); IOWA CODE § 335.25(3) (1983 &
Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-21-1(C) (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1324-102 (1992).
307. See RI. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-22 (1988).
308. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 30-28-115(2) (a) (1986); IND. CODE § 16-28-2-1 (1993); see
also Salsich, supranote 2, at 426 (noting that virtually all states with group home statutes require
licensing).
309. In New York, the only legitimate basis for neighborhood objection to homes for people
with mental disabilities is overconcentration and the resulting effects on the character of the
neighborhood. SeeN.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 41.34(c) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing
for hearing if community claims site selected would result in overconcentration of group care
facilities); see alsoTown of De Witt v. Surles, 591 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655-56 (App. Div. 1992) (finding
no overconcentration and upholding right of 10 former patients of psychiatric hospital to live
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state zoning preemption laws now require that group homes not be
located within a certain distance of one another 1 0 These requirements, known as dispersal requirements, vary in their approach.
States impose different space requirements, with 300 feet apparently
being the smallest distance.3
Several state statutes also contain density limits that limit the
number of people with mental disabilities that can reside in all group
homes within a municipality to a certain number of people or a
percentage of the municipality's total population.31 2 Unlike dispersal requirements, density limits restrict the number of people with
mental disabilities who can live in the group homes rather than the
number of homes themselves. 313 Other state statutes prohibit local
authorities from applying local zoning laws but include within the
31 4
state law itself complicated siting and dispersal procedures.
Further, some states expressly prohibit unreasonable discrimination
in zoning restrictions on group homes.3 15 Even in the absence of

in home in residential neighborhood); City of Kingston v. Surles, 582 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (App.
Div. 1992) (rejecting claim that community residence for 12 adults with psychiatric disabilities
would create saturation of such residences and alter neighborhood's character); City of Beacon
v. Surles, 558 N.Y.S.2d 196, 197 (App. Div. 1990) (finding home for 12 people with mental
disabilities would not cause overconcentration); Bedford v. New York, 533 N.Y.S. 2d 994, 995
(App. Div. 1988) (finding proposed facility would not create oversaturation). Other states have
also enacted zoning legislation regarding overconcentration. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-3f (West 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 309(c) (1987); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-66.1 (West
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-22 (1992).
310. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3f (West 1989) (barring establishment of group
homes within 1000 feet of existing group homes without local zoning approval); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 22, § 309(c) (1987) (providing that new home not be established within 5000 feet of existing
facility).
311. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-48-606(a) (1) (c) (Michie 1991).
312. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-66.1 (West 1991) (allowing municipality to deny
permits for group homes if existing residents of group homes exceed 0.5% of population).
313. Density limits are among the most irrational legislative reactions to the establishment
of homes for people with mental disabilities because they do not accomplish their purported
goal of limiting the number of people with disabilities who live in certain neighborhoods. Such
limits are vastly underinclusive because all people with mental disabilities do not live in group
homes. Many people with mental disabilities may reside with their families or in their own
home in the same neighborhood in which a group home is located. Yet these individuals would
not be counted toward the density limit. Similarly, density limits are overinclusive because not
all residents of group homes are mentally disabled. Some people who reside in group homes
are staff; yet the state laws that include density limits make no provision for excluding staff of
group homes from their density calculations.
314. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 41.34(c) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing
for hearing if community feels site selected by state would result in overconcentration of group
care facilities); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-3F (West 1989) (prohibiting siting of group homes
within 1000 feet of each other without approval of local zoning body); MICH. COMP. LAws §
125.216a (1992) (requiring state licensing agencies to notify towns where group homes are to
be located at least 45 days before licensing, and requiring towns to notify all residents within
1500 foot radius); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-22 (1992) (declaring that no group home shall be
located within one-half mile of existing group home).
315. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-52-75.1(a) (Supp. 1993).
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such statutes, courts have invalidated zoning restrictions on due
process or equal protection grounds. 1 6
In addition to preempting local zoning ordinances, many state
statutes also limit or void private restrictions in deeds, land contracts,
or leases that would exclude group homes from residential properties
or subdivisions. 17 In New York, for example, a state law known as
the Padavan Law specifically preempts local zoning laws by permitting
small group homes in all residential areas, provided certain procedures are followed regarding the selection of the site. 18 The New
York Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to circumvent this law in
Crane Neck Association v. New York City/Long Island County Services
Group.319 In Crane Neck, a neighborhood association sought to
enforce a restrictive covenant, adopted in 1945, limiting the use of
property within its boundaries to "single family dwellings" to exclude
a group home for eight adults with severe mental retardation. 2 °
Although the group home violated the restrictive covenant, the court
refused to enforce the covenant because "to do so would contravene
a long-standing public policy favoring the establishment of such
residences for the mentally disabled."32 1 Thus, the court held that
although it explicitly addresses only local laws and ordinances, the
Padavan Law also preempts restrictive covenants. 2 2
Surprisingly few state zoning statutes have been challenged in court.
Where such challenges were initiated, however, the courts have
upheld the laws on the ground that the state preemption statute bears
a substantial relation to a legitimate governmental objective and
properly overrides local control. 23

316. See, e.g., City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,450 (1985) (invalidating
city ordinance requiring special-use permit for group home);J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d
1126, 1131-32 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding denial of permit for group home for former mental
patients to be unreasonably discriminatory).
317. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 335.25.4 (West Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-23
(1992); W. VA. CODE § 27-17-4 (1992); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 46.03(22) (d) (West 1987). Ohio is
the only state that specifically permits the exclusion of group homes in political subdivisions. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.19(m) (Anderson 1993).
318. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993).
319. 460 N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1984).
320. Crane Neck Ass'n v. NewYork City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 460 N.E.2d 1336,
1337 (N.Y. 1984).
321. Id. at 1339.
322. Id. at 1341.
323. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. California Dep't of Health, 133 Cal. Rptr. 771,774-75 (Ct.
App. 1976) (holding that state statute mandating that group homes constitute residential uses
fostered legitimate state concern that was sufficient to override municipal affairs); Glennon
Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872, 876-77 (Colo. 1983) (holding that statutory
cities, as opposed to home-rule cities, receive power to zone from state and must abide by state
zoning regulations); City of Livonia v. Department of Social Servs., 378 N.W.2d 402, 414-15
(Mich. 1985) (noting that ability to zone is conferred upon localities by state and thus state may
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D. Enforcement Mechanisms Under the FHAA
In addition to expanding the types of transactions prohibited by the
original Fair Housing Act by extending its reach to local zoning laws
and restrictive covenants, the FHAA strengthens the tools available for
enforcement of the federal ban against housing discrimination. Most
significant, proof of discriminatory effect, or disparate impact, is
sufficient to support a claim under the FHAA. 24 Proof of discrimi-

preempt local zoning ordinances); Costleyv. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21,27-28 (Minn.
1981) (holding that state statute overrode local control over zoning for mentally retarded);
Mahrt v. City of Kalispell, 690 P.2d 418, 419 (Mont. 1984) (concluding that group home with
eight or fewer residents has unquestionable right to operate in any residentially zoned area);
State ex reL Thelen v. City of Missoula, 543 P.2d 173, 176-77 (Mont. 1975) (upholding state
statute declaring local zoning ordinance invalid and contrary to state policy of promoting right
of people with developmental disabilities to live in community); Mental Health Ass'n v. City of
Elizabeth, 434 A.2d 688, 690-91 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981) (ordering city to issue requested
building permit to plaintiffs and concluding that city had failed to meet its burden of proving
that legislature acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in enacting statute); Nichols v.
Tullahoma Open Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13, 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that statute
barring commercial use of property was not meant to exclude nonprofit group home). But see
Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780, 785 (Ind. 1991) (holding that retroactive application
of 1988 state preemption statute violated contract clause of state constitution); Garcia v. Siffrin
Residential Ass'n, 407 N.E.2d 1369, 1379-80 (Ohio 1980) (holding that state preemption statute
unreasonably limited enforcement by municipalities of police powers authorized by state
constitution), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981); Brownfield v. State, 407 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Ohio
1980) (rejecting notion that state is automatically exempt from local zoning regulations); see also
City of E. Cleveland v. Board of County Comm'rs, 430 N.E.2d 456, 459-60 (Ohio 1982) (stating
that state was not automatically immune from local zoning laws where neighbors of proposed
halfway house for former mental patients sued state that had purchased home but had not
applied to court for permit).
The court in Brownfield adopted a balancing test to determine whether a proposed use should
be immune from local zoning law, balancing the impact of the proposed home with legitimate
local interests. Bronmfield, 407 N.E.2d at 1367-68. A similar balancing test was adopted in
Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610, 612-13
(Fla. 1976) and Hayward v. Gaston, 542 A.2d 760,766 (Del. 1988). The Georgia Supreme Court
has rejected this test outright as too vague, and has instead provided immunity only where the
legislature has clearly expressed its intent. Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 314 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 1984).
324. When President Reagan signed the Fair Housing Amendments Act on September 13,
1988, he stated that the amendments should be construed to require discriminatory intent,
rather than discriminatory effect:
At the same time, I want to emphasize that this bill does not represent any congressional or executive branch endorsement of the notion, expressed in some judicial
opinions, that title 8 violations may be established by a showing of disparate impact or
discriminatory effects of a practice that is taken without discriminatory intent. Title 8
speaks only to intentional discrimination.
Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 1988 PUB. PAPERS 1155, 1156
(Sept. 13, 1988). But the President's attempt to draft legislative history after the fact drew sharp
retort by Senator Edward Kennedy, the principal sponsor of the amendments, who made clear
the following day that Congress did not contemplate any such intent requirement. Senator
Kennedy stated:
Unfortunately, President Reagan... announce[d] an interpretation of the act that this
[sic] flatly inconsistent with Congress's understanding of the law.... As the principal
Senate sponsor of the 1988 act, I can state unequivocally that Congress contemplated
no such intent requirement. The act did not materially alter the 1968 Fair Housing
Act provisions defining what is required to prove a discriminatory housing practice.
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natory intent is not now required nor was it required, under the
original version of the Act."z
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether
26
a showing of discriminatory intent is required under the FHAA,

...
There is no need to prove discriminatory intent.
134 CONG. REc. S12,449 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
325. A plaintiff may make out a prima facie case of disparate impact under the Fair Housing
Amendments Act by showing that a given practice has a greater impact on handicapped
applicants or residents than on non-handicapped applicants or residents. See Doe v. City of
Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that showing of either discriminatory intent or
impact is required under FHAA); Oxford House v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450,
461 (D.NJ. 1992) (establishing prima facie case of discrimination by showing disparate impact);
People Helpers, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 789 F.Supp. 725, 732 (E.D. Va. 1992) (stating that
discriminatory intent not required, but only that city acted for sole purpose of effectuating
desires of private citizens, that improper considerations were motivating factor behind those
desires, and that city decision makers were aware of citizens' motivations); Casa Marie, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 752 F. Supp. 1152, 1168 (D.P.R. 1990) (stating plaintiff need not
show discrimination was sole motivating factor for action, but only one motivating factor to
prove discriminatory impact); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732 (S.D. Ill. 1989)
(requiring proof of discriminatory "impact" rather than intent); see alsoMetropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that
discriminatory intent is not required to make prima facie case of discrimination under FHA),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir.
1977) (finding that evidence of intention, while required to establish prima facie case under
Constitution, is not required under title VIII). Discriminatory effect thus may be shown by proof
that all persons negatively affected by an allegedly unlawful practice are handicapped. See, e.g.,
Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 728 F. Supp. 1396, 1403 (D. Minn.) (stating in
FHAA case that "[a] law enacted without discriminatory intent may still be invalid if it has a
disparate impact on a protected group"), affid, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1990); Support Ministries
for Persons with AIDS v. Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 133-36 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)
(invalidating ordinance preventing opening of boarding home for persons with HIV after
establishing that denial of special permit constituted discriminatory intent and effect as
proscribed under FHAA); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 134142 (D.NJ. 1991) (granting preliminary injunction to plaintiffs in FHAA case challenging local
zoning law's definition of "family" as applied to home for recovering alcoholics).
326. The Supreme Court has provided mixed messages regarding the proof required in cases
of discrimination in other contexts. In 1985, the Court upheld the effects test under § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), by rejecting the state's
argument that only intentional discrimination was proscribed by the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at
294-97. As the Court stated, "much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the
Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act construed to
proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent." Id at 296-97. The Court noted,
however, that although some conduct that has a disparate impact on people with handicaps is
forbidden by § 504, the law does not necessarily reach all such actions. Id. at 298.
Two recent decisions in the employment context that reach opposite results provide a
distressing hint of what this Court would decide today. In St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113
S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the Court held that a title VII plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving
that an employer's discriminatory treatment was racially motivated. Id. at 274647. Justice
Souter filed a strong dissent, arguing that the decision is "unfair to plaintiffs, unworkable in
practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who present false evidence in court," such as
post hoc pretextual reasons for an adverse employment decision. Id. at 2761. Similarly, in
Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court increased the plaintiff's
statistical obligation by requiring a showing of disparity between the number of "qualified"
minorities in the job pool and the number actually employed, rather than between the gross
number of skilled and unskilledjobs. Id. at 650-55. The Court also required that the plaintiff
"prove" disparate impact for each employment practice complained of; previously, the Court had
allowed plaintiffs to establish an impact cumulatively for all relevant employment practices. Id.
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ten of the eleven U.S. courts of appeals that have addressed this issue
with respect to the original version of the law have held that title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 covers not only intentional housing
discrimination, but also housing practices that have discriminatory
effects, even where the plaintiff cannot prove discriminatory motive. 27 As Senator Kennedy made clear in his support for the FHAA:

at 656-57. The Court also reduced the employer's burden, making it easier to rebut the
plaintiff's evidence. Id. Prior to Ward's Cove, the employer could defend its actions by showing
that the disparate impact was a "business necessity." Id. The Court in Ward's Cove replaced the
"business necessity" standard with the easier "not insubstantial business reason" standard. Id.
Finally, the Court shifted to the plaintiff the burden of proving that this test had not been met,
an unusual approach for an affirmative defense. Id. at 652. These changes in Ward's Cove and
Hick regarding the use of statistics and the respective burdens of the parties effectively
transform disparate impact analysis into a form of intentional discrimination.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA) reversed the effect of the Ward's Cove decision, however,
by adding a new provision to title VII that establishes proof requirements for disparate impact
claims. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. III 1991). A complainant (the
Attorney General, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or an injured individual)
must demonstrate that a covered employer uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Id. § 2000e. If
the employer demonstrates that the challenged practice is "job related" and consistent with
"business necessity," the complaining party must demonstrate that an alternative employment
practice with less of a disparate impact exists and that the employer has refused to adopt it. Id.
§ 2000e-2. The CRA, however, does not have any effect on the Ward's Cove rule requiring
claimants in disparate impact cases to compare job category compositions with qualified labor
market or applicant pool compositions rather than with other job category compositions.
327. SeeAsburyv. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276,1279 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that prima facie
case for discrimination under Fair Housing Act requires proof of (1) membership in racial
minority, (2) application for and qualification to rent, (3) denial of opportunity to rent or
negotiate, and (4) subsequent availability of housing); NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 934 (2d Cir.) (stating that disparate impact is sufficient under Fair Housing Act to make
prima facie showing of discrimination), aF'd,488 U.S. 15 (1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782
F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 1986) (declaring that referendum may be set aside because of obvious
racial classification without proof of discriminatory intent); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736
F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating that landlord's housing practices may be illegal based
upon showing of disproportionate impact); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th
Cir. 1982) (finding possibility of discriminatory effect sufficient to state cause of action under
Fair Housing Act); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding that
discriminatory effect alone is sufficient for prima facie case under title VIII), cert. denied,435 U.S.
908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977) (outlining circumstances under which discriminatory impact without
discriminatory intent will suffice to show title VIII violation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978);
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 F.2d 438, 444 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that plaintiffi
were victims of "pattern of discrimination," compelling conclusion of racial motivation), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir.
1974) (finding discriminatory result sufficient to make prima facie case under title VIII), cert.
denied 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976)
("Effect, not motivation, is the touchstone because a thoughtless housing practice can be as
unfair to minorities as a willful scheme."); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting Fifth Circuit precedent on discriminatory effect issue and
thereby adopting holding of United States v. Pelzer Realty Co.); see also Margaret S. Rubin,
Advertisingand Title VIM The DiscriminatoryUse of Models in RealEstateAdvertisements, 98 YALE LJ.
165, 169-80 (1988) (discussing absence of intent requirement in title VIII causes of action). But
see Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Acci6n v. Secretary of HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 791 (1st Cir. 1986)
(declining to resolve issue of whether Fair Housing Act requires discriminatory intent).
In City of BlackJack, the Eighth Circuit permanently enjoined enforcement of a restrictive
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All of the Federal courts of appeals that have considered the
question have concluded that title VIII should be construed, at least
in some instances, to prohibit acts that have discriminatory effects,
and that there is no need to prove discriminatory intent. ... In
enacting the Fair Housing Amendments Act, Congress accepted this
28
consistent judicial interpretation.

The FHAA also seeks to remedy the problems of the original law by
providing several enforcement options to complainants. The FHAA
gives HUD the authority to investigate and bring lawsuits when
mediation efforts fail and establishes an administrative enforcement
mechanism for cases where discriminatory housing practices cannot
be resolved informally. An individual or the Secretary of HUD may
file a complaint with HUD within one year of the alleged discriminatory housing practice.
The Secretary must investigate the complaint within 100 days of the filing date... and file a final investigative report. 331 If no conciliation agreement can be reached, the
Secretary must then determine whether "reasonable cause exists to
believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about
to occur., 332 The Secretary must base the determination of "reason-

able cause" only on the facts of each specific case. 3 3 If HUD finds

zoning ordinance that effectively prohibited the construction of multiracial, federally subsidized
moderate- and low-income housing because it violated title VIII. City of BlackJack, 508 F.2d at
1188. The city claimed that the motive of the ordinance was not discrimination, but fear that
the proposed apartments would destroy the city's residential character, cause traffic problems,
and devalue the property. Id. at 1186. The court of appeals disagreed. Id It found that the
ordinance would "foreclose 85 percent of the blacks living in the metropolitan area from
obtaining housing in Black Jack ... at a time when 40 percent of them were living in
substandard or overcrowded units." Id. Consequently, the court believed that implementation
of the zoning ordinance would "contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in a community
which was 99 percent white." Id. Convinced that the city had failed to demonstrate a
compelling interest for its action, the court permanently enjoined enforcement of the ordinance
as violative of title VIII. Id. at 1188.
328. 134 CONG. REC. S12,449 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). In the
proposed regulations, HUD included several provisions that contained language that could be
interpreted to require proof of discriminatory intent in order to establish a violation of title VIII.
Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 44,996
(1988) (to be codified at scattered sections of 24 C.F.R.) (proposed Nov. 7, 1988) (stating that
regulations proscribe behavior which is "designed to discourage" persons from attaining
housing). Comments to HUD on the proposed regulations urged changing the language to
clarify that no showing of intent is required. See Comments of the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights Fair Housing Task Force on the Proposed Rule of H.U.D. Implementing the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (Dec. 7, 1988) (on file with The American University Law
Review).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1) (A) (i) (1988). The original Fair Housing Act required that the
complaint be filed within 180 days. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(b), 82
Stat. 82, 86 (repealed 1988).
330. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1) (B)(iv) (1988).
331. Id. § 3610(b) (5) (A).
332. Id. § 3610(g)(1).
333. Id.
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"reasonable cause" to believe that a violation exists, or is about to
occur, the Secretary must issue a charge."M If a charge is issued, the
aggrieved party must either authorize the Attorney General to begin
a civil action in federal court or proceed to a hearing before an
administrative law judge.1 5 The aggrieved party also has the right
to bypass the administrative procedures altogether and proceed
directly to federal court.L3 The procedures for such action remain
essentially unchanged from the original version of the Fair Housing
Act, except that Congress extended the statute of limitations from 180
days to two years."' The FHAA also permits a court to appoint an
attorney "if in the opinion of the court such person is financially
unable to bear the costs of such action." 38
Further, the Attorney General may file suit on behalf of the United
States where there is a pattern or practice of discrimination or acts of
discrimination against a group.33 9 The Attorney General is also
charged with enforcing the FHAA against state and local governments
whose zoning, land-use, or state fair housing laws violate the
FHAA.3 4 The FHAA gives the Attorney General authority to seek
enforcement of conciliation agreements in federal court, although she
is not required to do so."
Unlike the original Fair Housing Act, the FHAA contains a

334. Id. § 3610(g)(2)(A).
335. Id. § 3612(b). The hearing before the ALJ must begin within 120 days after the date
of the charge. Id. § 3612(g). The ALJ must then make findings of fact and conclusions of law
within 60 days of the hearing. Id. If the aggrieved party prevails, the ALJ may award actual
damages and additional penalties, including attorneys fees. Id. Once the administrative hearing
has begun, the party may no longer file a complaint in federal court. Id. § 3612(a) (3).
The Justice Department has diligently pursued cases under the FHAA (as compared to its
enforcement of the original FHA). See, e.g., Complaint at 2-3, United States v. Grady
Management, Inc., No. 90-0060-A (E.D. Va., Jan. 18, 1990) (suing corporate management
company on behalf of service provider seeking to rent apartments to operate residential
treatment program for recovering alcoholics and drug abusers); Complaint at 1-3, United States
v. Sigal/Zuckerman Management, Inc., No. 90-0059A, (E.D. Va., Jan. 18, 1990) (suing
Management Company on behalf of service providers seeking to rent apartment for person who
had successfully completed residential drug and alcohol treatment program); Complaint at 3,
United States v. Park Forest, Ltd., No. 89-0630-B (S.D. Iowa, Sept. 15, 1989) (suing landlords to
prevent eviction of physically disabled woman).
336. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1988) (outlining procedures for commencing civil action). Some
members of Congress, however, considered the administrative procedure to be the "heart of the
bill." 134 CONG. REC. H4608 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
337. Compare42 U.S.C. § 3613 (a) (1) (A) (1988) (providing for two-year statute of limitations)
with Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 812(a), 82 Stat. 82, 88 (setting statute of
limitations at 180 days).
338. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(2) (1988).
339. Id. § 3614(a). This procedure was the only way the Federal Government could enforce
the 1968 Fair Housing Act. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 813, 82 Stat. 82, 88.

340.

42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1988).

341. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(b) (1988). Previously, compliance was voluntary. Fair Housing Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 813, 82 Stat. 82, 88.
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provision permitting the Justice Department to pursue a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order in situations requiring
emergency action. 42 This provision provides a mechanism for quick
governmental action to preserve the availability of the housing in
question pending a final adjudication of the discrimination claim.
The procedure is simple and expeditious: once HUD determines the
necessity for temporary emergency relief and refers the matter to the
Justice Department, the Department must promptly institute an
appropriate civil action. 3 This provision is particularly important
to a person facing eviction because he or she simply cannot wait for
completion of the investigative and adjudicative process.
Following a finding of discrimination by an administrative lawjudge
(ALJ), the Act provides for broad remedies, including injunctive
relief, actual damages, punitive damages, 4 and attorney's fees.34 5
No relief order, however, may affect "any contract, sale, encumbrance,
or lease consummated before the issuance of such order and
involving a bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant without
actual notice of the charge filed under this [title]. "46
Not surprisingly, strict time limitations apply under the FHAA. For
example, an ALJ must commence the adjudicative hearing no later
than 120 days following the charge "unless it is impracticable to do
so. " ' 7 Similarly, the Secretary of HUD must review an ALJ's decision within thirty days after the issuance of the ALJ's order." s The
purpose of the time limits, it appears, is not to deter the filing of
meritorious claims, but to expedite administrative proceedings to
provide faster relief to legitimate claimants.
E. State FairHousingLaws
At least thirty states currently have statutes prohibiting housing

342. Compare42 U.S.C. § 3610 (e) (1988) with Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284,
§ 813, 82 Stat. 81, 88.
343. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(e) (1988). In HUD's proposed regulations, HUD suggested adding
two additional steps to the emergency relief provision: (1) empower the Office of the General
Counsel, rather than the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, to seek
temporary relief; and (2) require the General Counsel to consult with the Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Rights Division prior to seeking temporary relief. 53 Fed. Reg. 44,992,
45,012-13 (1988) (proposed Nov. 7, 1988). These proposals were not included in the final
version of the regulations.
344. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g) (1988). The FHAA provides for unlimited punitive damages, id.,
and allows for attorney's fees regardless of whether the prevailing party can pay the cost, as is
the case in other federal statutes that allow the recovery of attorney's fees. Id. § 3612(p).
345. Id. § 3612(p).
346. Id. § 3612(g)(4).
347. Id. § 3612(g)(1).
348. Id. § 3612(h).
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discrimination on the basis of handicap. 4 9 At first glance, these
statutes appear strikingly similar in their terms and scope. As the
following discussion illustrates, however, these laws not only vary
widely from state to state, but now must withstand scrutiny under the
FHAA.
Personsprotected

1.

Although most state fair housing statutes protect people with
mental disabilities from discrimination in housing, each statute
defines "mental disability" differently. Thus, a person with a mental
illness is specifically protected from discrimination in Alaska,"' ° but
the same person might not be protected from discrimination in other
states where the law protects only persons with specified mental
disabilities that do not include mental illness. 5 1 Further, other
states exclude alcoholism and drug abuse, which are considered
mental illnesses by some authorities, from the definition of mental
disability under their fair housing statutes.5 '
This lack of uniformity with respect to the populations protected by
state fair housing laws has begun to be resolved as states respond to
the FHAA.353 Some states, however, anticipated the fair housing law
and its adoption of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicap
and incorporated that definition into their fair housing laws. 54
Other states have crafted more complex definitions of mental
disability in their fair housing laws. Alaska, for example, adopted the
following definition of mental illness:
[Mental illness is] an organic, mental, or emotional impairment
that has substantial adverse effects on an individual's ability to
exercise conscious control of the individual's actions or ability to
perceive reality or to reason or understand; mental retardation,

349. See infra notes 350-81 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes proscribing
discrimination based on mental disability).
350.
351.

See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.865 (1990).
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (West Supp. 1992) (limiting coverage to

those with mental conditions diagnosed by medical professional).
352. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(22) (1993) (distinguishing mental disorders
from conditions resulting from substance abuse or mental retardation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A3 (1987) (excluding alcoholism and drug addiction or abuse from definition of "mental
impairment"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4501 (Supp. 1990) (excluding alcohol- or drug-addicted
persons who are threats to others from definition of "handicapped individual").
353. For example, prior to the FHAA, New Hampshire law protected only persons with a
mental "handicap, other than illness." N.H. REV.STAT. ANN. § 354-A3 (1989). The amended
statute includes the definition of "mental impairment" found in the FHAA. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A2 (Supp. 1992).
354. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4602 (Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2 (Michie
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 25, § 1451 (West Supp. 1993); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.400 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(lm) (West 1992).
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epilepsy, drug addiction, and alcoholism do not per se constitute
mental illness, although persons suffering55from these conditions
may also be suffering from mental illness.
Although this statute appears to cover certain groups excluded from
other states' laws, it is not clear what kinds of disabilities fall within
the category of those having "substantial adverse effects." 5 6
Maryland's law defines "mental handicap" as "any mental impairment or deficiency [such] as, but not limited to, retardation or such
other which may have necessitated remedial or special education and
related services." s" It is not clear, however, whether psychological
services or psychiatric treatment fall within the category of "related
services.""5 s Therefore, the possibility remains that in Maryland,
people labeled mentally ill who are receiving or have received
supportive services different from those designed to meet the needs
of people with mental retardation would not be protected under the
state's fair housing law.
In an effort to avoid such ambiguities, some states have chosen to
rely on mental health professionals to determine which individuals
will be considered mentally disabled for the purpose of receiving
protection under the state's fair housing law. In Maine, for example,
a person is protected by the law if the person has a "mental condition
S..

that constitutes a substantial disability as determined by ...
359

a

psychiatrist or psychologist."
An additional method of narrowing the scope of individuals
covered by a state's fair housing law is to protect only those individuals whose mental handicap is "unrelated to the person's ability to
acquire, rent, or maintain a housing accommodation." s6 In such
states, however, there is no indication of which factors should be
considered in determining a person's ability "to acquire, rent, or
maintain a housing accommodation."36 1 The state, therefore, may
be unintentionally fostering, rather than eliminating, discrimination
by permitting the consideration of factors unrelated to the potential

355. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915 (1990).
356. Id.
357. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15 (1991).
358. Id.
359. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (West Supp. 1992).
360. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103 (I) (2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); see alsoMICH. STAT.
ANN. § 3.550(502) (Callaghan 1990) (limiting protection to persons with disabilities unrelated
to ability to rent, acquire, or maintain property); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1991) (using
language similar to Illinois statute); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-13-1(4)(b) (Supp. 1993)
(limiting applicability of housing discrimination law to disabilities unrelated to one's ability to
acquire, rent, or maintain property).
361. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103(I)(2).
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tenant's ability to meet the lease obligations. It is likely, however, that
the courts will invalidate such a provision because the FHAA excludes
any requirement that a tenant with a disability provide proof of
independent living skills prior to securing housing.362
2.

Personsprohibitedfrom discriminating

The state fair housing laws generally apply to all individuals
involved in real estate transactions, including any owner, lessee,
managing agent, or other person having the right to sell, rent, or
lease any real property, or an agent or employee of any such
person.36 3 Many statutes include a separate section specifically
applying to banks, banking organizations, mortgage companies,
insurance companies, or other financial institutions or lending
organizations to whom applications are made for assistance to
purchase, lease, acquire, construct, rehabilitate, repair, or maintain
any real property 36
3.

Prohibitedconduct

Like the FHAA, state fair housing laws generally prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, or leasing of any real property.6 5 Some
states also include the subleasing6 and assigning 67 of properties.

362. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988); see supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing
evidence of independent living skills as requirement for tenancy).
363. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.8 (West
Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, §
4 (1982 & Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subdiv. 2(1) (West Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-305(1) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-12 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1991); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2-a)
(McKinney 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1452 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §
659.430(4) (1991); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(2) (West Supp.
1992).
364. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254 (West 1982);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (West Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 4 (1982 & Supp.
1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 23 (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 2(3) (West
Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.045 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-306
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1991);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-13 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 20-13-21 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-90 (Michie 1990); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9
(Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(2) (West Supp. 1992).
365. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.8 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582
(West Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22(a) (1), (b) (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.03 subd. 2(1) (a) (West Supp. 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.040 (Vernon Supp. 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(1) (a) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:10 (Supp. 1992); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1991); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296(2-a) (McKinney 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.430(1) (a) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 955 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 20-13-20 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9
(Supp. 1993).
366. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.8 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd.
(1) (a) (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A10 (Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-
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The statutes that prohibit the most activities include the phrase "or
otherwise deny" and make explicit that all transactions relating to real
estate are subject to the prohibitions contained in the statute."
Perhaps the broadest state fair housing law is North Carolina's,
which provides that "[e] ach handicapped citizen shall have the same
right as any other citizen to live and reside in residential communities, homes, and group homes."369 The language of this statute
more closely resembles zoning legislation than fair housing laws. The
North Carolina statute, however, does appear to integrate the interests
sought to be protected by both zoning and fair housing laws. While
this statute does not single out particular real estate transactions, it
does establish that people with disabilities have the same right as
others to live in residential communities. The effect of the law, then,
is the same as other fair housing laws-to prohibit discrimination in
real estate transactions involving housing in residential communities.
The law does not apply, however, to other types of real estate
transactions or commercial property transactions, which are covered
by some of the other more detailed state fair housing laws.37 0
4.

Other discriminatory acts
a.

Prohibited inquiries

Some state fair housing laws make it illegal to "make an inquiry of
the ... physical or mental disability.., of a person seeking to buy,
lease, or rent a housing accommodation or property."7 1 Such
provisions ensure that people with disabilities (including people with
mental disabilities whose disability may not be readily apparent) are

12 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1991); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2-a)
(McKinney 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.430(1) (a) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-20
(Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1993).
367. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.8 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd.
(1) (a) (West Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7
(Michie 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-13-20 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp.
1993).
368. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (West Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B,
§ 22 (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 2(1) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 213.040 (Vernon Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296 (McKinney 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp.
1993).
Other state statutes simply provide that "[t]he fact that a person is or has been evaluated or
treated for mental illness may not be a basis for discrimination in... obtaining or retaining
housing." ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.865 (1990); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-506 (1986).
369. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-9 (1987).
370. See supra notes 365-68 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that proscribe
discrimination in real estate transactions).
371. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1993); see alsoPA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h) (6) (Supp.
1993) (prohibiting inquiries regarding handicap or disability).
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evaluated solely on the basis of criteria that are relevant to real estate
transactions and that apply to all housing applicants and occupants.
In short, it may be illegal under various state fair housing laws for a
landlord, real estate agent, or even mortgage officer to ask whether
an individual has undergone treatment for mental illness or other
disability.
b.

Misrepresentationsof poperty values

Among the greatest obstacles to securing housing for people with
mental disabilities is neighborhood opposition.
Neighbors of
prospective homes for people with mental disabilities have claimed
that people with mental disabilities are dangerous and that permitting
them to live in their neighborhoods will lower property values, change
the character of their neighborhood, and even endanger their
safety.s1 2
Such unwarranted fears and prejudice have figured
prominently in zoning cases involving challenges to the establishment
of group homes."7 3 Similar attitudes may contribute to discrimination against people with mental disabilities in their efforts to acquire
individual, independent housing accommodations or real property.
Some state fair housing laws therefore include a provision similar to
Oklahoma's statute, which makes the following discriminatory practice
unlawful:
[T]o knowingly induce or attempt to induce another person to
transfer an interest in real property, or to discourage another
person from purchasing real property, by representations regarding
the existing or potential proximity of real property owned, used, or
occupied by persons of any particular... handicap, or to represent
that such existing or potential property shall or may result in:
a. the lowering of property values,
b. a change in the... character of the block, neighborhood, or
area in which the property is located,
c. an increase in criminal or antisocial behavior in the3 74area, or
d. a decline in quality of the schools serving the area.

372. A study of the General Accounting Office reported that "decline in real estate values,"
the neighbors' common objection prior to the opening of a group home, was seldom mentioned
after the home was in operation. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF ZONING AND
OTHER PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ESTABISHMENT OF GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED

9 (1983).
373. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing role of fear and prejudice in
neighborhood opposition to group homes); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text
(discussing widespread fear of people with mental disabilities).
374. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1452(12) (West Supp. 1993). Illinois and Wisconsin have
enacted similar statutory prohibitions. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para 3-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(2) (in) (West Supp. 1992).
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Such provisions may not eliminate the fears and prejudices that
prevent people with mental disabilities from acquiring housing, but
they do send a message that the state intends for its citizens to
provide equal treatment to such people in real estate transactions.
Further, expanding the scope of state fair housing laws in this manner
is consistent with empirical data that establishes that people with
mental disabilities make good neighbors; it also enables the state to
address an often more subtle and insidious form of discrimination.
Restrictive covenants
Restrictive covenants allow landowners to circumvent state fair
housing laws by preventing property from passing to certain people,
such as people with mental disabilities, or by restricting the property
to certain uses. To protect against unlawful discrimination through
the use of restrictive covenants, some states, such as Arkansas, prohibit
any restrictive covenants that discriminate on the basis of a mental
handicap.37 5 Such laws further the state's fair housing goals by
assuring that restrictive covenants will not be used as a means to
obstruct the efforts of people with mental disabilities from acquiring
residential housing or real property. Faced with a restrictive covenant
excluding mentally disabled persons and a fair housing law protecting
such persons from unlawful discrimination, a court would likely
invalidate such a covenant on the grounds that it contravenes state
Incorporating a provision that explicitly bans restrictive
law.
covenants would preclude any questions of their validity and eliminate
expensive and time-consuming litigation that might otherwise be
required to invalidate the covenant.
c.

Exemptions to statefair housing laws
Although most state fair housing laws are broad in their scope and
coverage, some provide exemptions for certain classes of people or
certain transactions. For example, many statutes provide that the
state's fair housing law should not be construed to prohibit dwellings
or residential facilities that are designed exclusively for and occupied
37 6 Similarly, many
exclusively by individuals of the same gender.
state statutes place the sale or rental of dwellings or facilities designed
exclusively for elderly persons beyond the reach of the state fair
5.

375. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-48-611 (Michie 1991); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 518-3 (Supp.
1990); RI. GEN. LAWS § 34-4-25 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.224 (West 1990).
376. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 21 (Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
Supp. 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1993).
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housing law.3 7
States with fair housing laws that protect persons with mental illness
or other mental disabilities are generally careful to allow programs,
services, or facilities designed specifically to benefit this population.378 Some states also provide an exception for owner-occupied
housing or housing occupied by the owner's family.7 9 In short, the
scope and interpretation of each state's fair housing law varies
according to the interaction between the prohibited transactions and
the definition of the population that is protected by the law.
Furthermore, to the extent that a provision of a state's fair housing
law is inconsistent with the FHAA, it will be subject to repeal or court
challenge.'
Thus, the new challenge that lawyers, mental health
advocates, and legislators face is to ensure that state fair housing laws
are consistent with the federal law and to encourage states to provide
additional measures of protection where the federal law may be
inadequate to facilitate the integration of people with mental
8
disabilities into our residential neighborhoods."

CONCLUSION

The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 represents the boldest

377. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4607 (Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 21
(Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
354-A.5. (Supp. 1992); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1453
(West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(2g)
(West 1988).
378. See, e.g., MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 9-1101 (1993) (establishing Maryland Advisory
Council for Individuals with Disabilities to provide services to people with mental disabilities);
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 153 (McKinney 1993) (reimbursing expenditures to assist mentally and
physically disabled persons); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 27-4-1 (1992) (providing assistance for
special medical needs of disabled persons).
379. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4607 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254
(West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A13 (Supp. 1992); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1453 (West Supp. 1993).
380. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988) (stating that FHAA will not invalidate state statutes with
greater protections for handicapped persons than provided under FHAA).
381. Massachusetts has recently enacted a statute making unlawful all health, safety, land-use,
and zoning laws that discriminate against people with disabilities. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A, §
3 (Law. Co-op. 1993). Further, several state attorney generals have recently issued opinions
invalidating provisions of their respective state laws because they violate the FHAA. See Op. Att'y
Gen. of Del., Op. No. 90-001, 1990 De. AG LEXIS, at *10 (Jan. 5, 1990) (invalidating Delaware
law requiring 5000 feet between group homes for people with developmental disabilities); 74
Op. Att'y Gen. of Md., Op. No. 89-026, reprintedin 16 Md. Reg. 2010 (Aug. 7, 1989) (invalidating
Maryland dispersion and concentration rules as violative of FHAA); Op. Att'y Gen. of Kan., Op.
No. 89-99, 1989 Kan. AG LEXIS 100 (Aug. 11, 1989) (invalidating special use permit and 1000foot dispersal rule under FHAA); Op. Att'y Gen. ofTex., Op. No.JM-1093, 1989 Tex. AG LEXIS
95 (Sept. 5, 1989) (holding invalid bill requiring disclosure of HIV-related illness of current or
previous occupant of any property). But see 75 Op. Att'y Gen. of Md., Op. No. 90-014, repinted
in 17 Md. Reg. 1442 (Mar. 7, 1990) (upholding procedure requiring public hearing for group
home applications as lawful under FHAA).
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action by the Federal Government to curb discrimination in housing
against people with mental disabilities. It provides a clear message to
state and local governments as well as private property owners that
discrimination against people with mental illness, developmental
disabilities, or people who are perceived as mentally disabled will not
be permitted. No longer will localities and individuals be free to
discriminate against people with mental disabilities with impunity.
The existence of the law itself, however, will not eradicate discrimination.
The results of the FHAA depend on several factors. First, the
effectiveness of the FHAA will depend in part on federal agencies,
such as HUD and the Justice Department, and the resources they
devote and their commitment to enforcing the law."' 2 Although the
Justice Department has actively pursued cases since the FHAA's
enactment, it must continue to do so in order to convey the message
to landlords and neighbors that the Federal Government will not
tolerate discrimination against people with mental disabilities.
Second, the law's effectiveness will depend on changing societal
attitudes about people with mental disabilities. Prejudice against
people with mental disabilities is prevalent, even with the enactment
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.38 ' People are often supportive of the rights of people with disabilities to live in the community,
but when they find out that their new neighbors are people labeled
mentally ill or people with developmental disabilities, their attitudes
often change. Resisting that change in attitude and supporting efforts
to assist people with mental disabilities to live "next door" will help.
Such progress does not depend only on the extent to which those
who are considered "different" are physically integrated with the rest
of the population. Just as segregation can stigmatize people with
mental disabilities, so too can integration that merely emphasizes
another's differences. 3 4 This is the lesson of group homes and
other congregate housing programs. The practice of developing
separate housing for people with mental disabilities that is located in
residential neighborhoods, but that is not truly integrated into the life
382. Problems with the FHAA have already been identified. See, e.g., F. Willis Caruso &
William H.Jones, FairHousing in the 1990's: An Overview of Recent Developments and Prognosis of
theirImpac 22J. MARSHALL L. REV. 421, 440-46 (1989) (identifying problems in FHAA in areas
of administration, procedure, substantive rights, and remedies); Michael A. Wolf, Comment, The
FairHousingAmendments Act of 1988: A OiticalAnalysis of "FamilialStatus,"54 MO. L REV. 393,
402-04 (1989) (concluding that problems families face in housing are not solved by FHAA
because problems are primarily economic).
383. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. 111990).
384. MiNOW, supra note 24, at 116-17 (citingJustice Marshall for proposition that separation
that exaggerates differences is root of prejudice).
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of the community, conveys the message that the residents of such
housing are different and should be avoided. As long as people with
mental disabilities are rejected in this way, and as long as such actions
go unchallenged, people with mental disabilities will remain segregated, wherever they live. Accordingly, we must now begin to abandon
the term "integration" and work toward inclusive or nonsegregated
housing-housing that is equally available to all."s In short, the
quality of life available to all must, in a very real sense, also become
available to people with disabilities.
Yet a major problem not addressed by the FHAA is one of the most
serious problems facing all of society today, namely the lack of
affordable housing. Although the barrier of discrimination may be
removed with vigilant enforcement of the FHAA, the law will help
people with mental disabilities only if they can afford the housing
units to which they are legally entitled. s8
- For the past two decades,
however, HUD has allowed, and even sponsored, the destruction of
housing and the conversion of temporary and permanent housing for
low-income people to housing for more affluent residents. Each year,

approximately 2.5 million Americans lose their homes, and as many
as 500,000 low-rent units disappear as a result of urban renewal and
gentrification." Thousands of Americans are on waiting lists for
public housing."' 8 Still others, perhaps as many as one-in-five poor
persons, are forced to live in substandard housing."8 9 Not only is
there a shortage of adequate affordable housing, but a poor person
must spend a greater proportion of his or her income on housing.
Consequently, many people become homeless. For people with

385. See O'Connor & Racino, supra note 38, at 137-60.
386. SeeJames A. Kushner, The FairHousingAmendments Act of 1988. The Second Generation of
FairHousing,42 VAND. L. RV. 1049, 1105-06 (1989). According to Professor Kushner, title VIII
should be amended to prevent landlords from denying housing to recipients of public assistance.
Id. In Kushner's view, welfare recipients are arguably the best tenants because they have income
that is not dependent on job stability and local economics. Id. Yet, they are often excluded not
on economic grounds, but because of the landlord's desire not to stigmatize the housing as
.welfare housing." Id. at 1106. Professor Kushner notes that many state and localities have
enacted legislation specifically prohibiting discrimination against welfare recipients. Id. (citing
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515(a) (1987); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(1) (West 1973 & Supp. 1982)).
Kushner also observes that most courts typically construe title VIII to prohibit such discrimination. Id. (citing NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,934 (2d Cir.), aftd,109 S.Ct. 276
(1988) (per curiam)); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 376 (1988); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038-40 (2d Cir.
1979)). Given these practices, Kushner argues persuasively that either Congress should amend
the FHAA to cover such bias explicitly or HUD should issue regulations specifying such
prohibitions. Id.
387. See Dionne, supranote 74, at A18.
388. Dionne, supranote 74, at A18.
389. Dionne, supra note 74, at A18.
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9°
mental disabilities, homelessness can be particularly devastating.
The Housing Act of 1949 declared the national goal of providing
"a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family." 9 ' Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that everyone has a right to a standard of living sufficient to
enable him and his family to have housing.9 2 The Supreme Court,
however, has never recognized a constitutionally protected right to
housing under federal law. Accordingly, decent housing remains
unavailable for many Americans, and the FHAA will not remedy this
situation. To ensure housing for all, the Supreme Court must hold
that there is a fundamental right to housing. Alternatively, Congress
can recognize the right to housing. Until then, the right of people
with mental disabilities to be free of discrimination will be the law,
while in practice, decent, affordable housing will remain unavailable.

390. See Arlene S. Kanter, Homeless But Not Helpless: Legal Issues in the Care of Homeless People
with Mental Illness, 45 J. Soc. IssuEs 91, 101-03 (1989) (concluding that recent efforts to
institutionalize mentally ill homeless people are misdirected solutions to solving problems of
mentally ill homeless people); Kanter, supra note 31, at 351-57 (concluding that institutionalizing
efforts will not solve problems of homelessness for mentally ill); see also Heard v. Cuomo, 567
N.Y.S.2d 594, 599 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (ordering city to provide appropriate housing for people
discharged from mental hospitals, but due to shortage of adequate housing, delaying
implementation ofjudgment "over a period of time").
391. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
392. UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1), GA. Res. 217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948),
reprintedin UNrrED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 135, 140 (DusanJ. Djonovich ed., 1973).

